

HUNTERSTON SITE STAKEHOLDER GROUP

The Sixty Fourth Meeting of the Hunterston Site Stakeholder Group will take place on
Wednesday 1 June 2022 at 1330 Hrs

Venue – The Waterside, Ardrossan Road, West Kilbride, KA23 9NG
Light Refreshments will be served from 1245 prior to the meeting

AGENDA

13.30 Chairman's Opening Remarks and Declarations of Interest

13.35 Chair and Vice Chair Updates and Correspondence

13.40 Actions and approval of previous Minutes

13.45 Hunterston B Site Reports

Hunterston B Report – Joe Struthers

ONR Report – Stuart Fannin

SEPA Report – Keith Hammond

***Members Question and Answer Session
Public Forum***

14.30 Hunterston A Station Reports

Hunterston A Site Report – Mark Blackley

ONR Report – Stuart Fannin

SEPA Report – Melanie Hayes

***Members Question and Answer Session
Public Forum***

15.15 NDA Reports

NDA Reports – David Wallace

15.25 Update from Scottish Government

SG Report – Diane Hamilton

***Members Question and Answer Session
Public Forum***

15.40 Any Other Business

Next Meeting Thursday 1 September 2022

**HUNTERSTON SITE STAKEHOLDER GROUP
SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS FROM THE SIXTY THIRD MEETING
HELD ON THURSDAY 3 MARCH 2022 ONLINE, ZOOM PLATFORM**

Chair's Opening Remarks and Vice Chair Updates and Correspondence

Mrs Holmes welcomed new community members - Mr Jamie Black, Largs CC and Mr John McHenery, Cumbrae CC. The Chair summarised Magnox SSG Chairs and Vice Chairs Meeting on 11 February 2022. She was concerned that there was not more Scottish SSG representation on the Nuclear Legacy Advisory Forum (NuLEAF).

Actions and Approval of Previous Minutes

The Minutes of the virtual meeting of 2 December 2021 were approved and an update on actions received.

Hunterston B Report – Mr Joe Struthers, Ms Allison Adamson

The end of generation was an emotional day for the Station and tribute was paid to the staff team and contract partners. Reactor 3 is being prepared for defueling with some plant modifications. Fuel handling and Reactor case handling safety cases are being reviewed by ONR. The flask corridor is being upgraded. EDF was proud that 100% of employees who wished to remain on site had secured positions. 97% of staff had their aspirations met, either through redundancy or remaining on site. The process was subject to an independent review and fared well.

ONR Report – Mr Stuart Fannin

Mr Fannin formally recorded ONR's congratulations to HB team on the successful period of final operation, acting both safely and compliantly. The Station was now preparing for defueling. There were two inspections during the period: COMAH (Control of Major Accident Hazards) and Licence Condition 7. There were two notable events during the period. One was a conventional health and safety event with an operative getting their hand trapped in a pressure test vessel. The second was administrative, with an anomaly in nuclear material accounting records. ONR's permission is needed to shut down the reactors permanently and safely and begin defueling and the safety cases for this are being considered.

SEPA Report – Mr Keith Hammond

The Radioactive Substances Regulation inspection took place on 18 February. The Station was compliant with some improvements required. The Station lost control of 1,000-1,500 litres of lightly contaminated oil (tritium). This was captured in the lagoon and did not enter the environment. SEPA is still investigating. In October 2021, a gasket containing asbestos was misconsigned when going to Cyclife. SEPA issued an Advisory letter was issued, the lowest form of enforcement. SEPA has published its Compliance Assessment Scheme results for 2019 on its website.

Hunterston A Reports – Mr Mark Blackley

Good progress is being made on the programme of work. Recent storms have not caused any significant damage. It is 11 months since the last Lost Time Accident on site. An ESSHQ review by Magnox Executive Team on 16 February was successful. The target for waste retrieval from SAWBR and WILWREP had been increased from 46 tons to 53 tons to 62 tons, with 70 tons anticipated by March. Welfare facilities are being improved. Walkways and floor gratings on reactors are being replaced. Learning and Development building is being demolished. Modifications are being made to the WILWREP plant to receive acids. A new pond sump and effluent treatment plant is being installed. An extensive recruitment campaign is underway, including four new trainees appointed.

ONR Report

The ONR report was circulated with the meeting papers. Mr Kings was not present at the meeting. Mrs Holmes noted that this would have been Mr Kings' last meeting as he is retiring at the end of April and offered her thanks and best wishes.

SEPA Report – Ms Melanie Hayes

Inspectors did a follow-up visit to inspect SILWE Records. Maintenance schedules were part of a joint inspection with ONR. There were no compliance issues but some procedural improvements suggested. A meeting on Best Practicable Means documentation to demonstrate compliance with Environmental Authorisations (Scotland) Regulations 2018 (EASR) was held. A number of variations to the site permit are likely over the coming year.

NDA Reports – Mr David Wallace

The NDA Stakeholder Summit will be on 7/8 September 2022 in Edinburgh. The National Audit Office report on the decommissioning of Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGRs) was issued on 28 January 2022. The NDA has invested £0.5M in Kilwinning Campus. The NDA has beacon projects focussing on realising opportunities and solving challenges. The three key Beacon projects include Sustainability; Skills; and Social Value.

Update from Scottish Government – Ms Diane Hamilton, Mr Martin Macdonald

The focus of the Higher Activity Waste (HAW) Policy Review is the implementation of the 2011 policy and the Higher Activity Radioactive Waste strategy in 2016. A Technical Workstream will be undertaken with NDA to develop thinking around the 'near surface near site' concept and better understand the radioactive waste inventory in Scotland and consider the issues and challenges in the 2016 strategy.

Presentation on Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGR) Decommissioning – Mr Alastair Walker, Ms Allison Adamson, Mr John McNamara

Combined presentation on AGR Decommissioning comprising Overview; the AGR Decommissioning Agreement; Roles and Responsibilities; Governance; Socio-Economics and Skills; EDF's Nuclear Decommissioning Mission; EDF's Defueling Programme; End of Generation Timescales; What is the Defueling Process: Hunterston B Defueling; Working With Our People. Context – The Future for Magnox; What the Revised AGR Decommissioning Arrangements Mean for Us and Our Next Steps; Our Approach; Strategic Alignment Between NDA, Magnox and EDF.

There were a number of questions asked by members, the detail of which can be read in the full Minute of the meeting, available from the Secretariat.

Next Meeting – Wednesday 1 June 2022 at 1.30 pm, in person at The Waterside Hotel, East Kilbride.



**HUNTERSTON SITE STAKEHOLDER GROUP
MINUTES OF SIXTY THIRD MEETING HELD ON
THURSDAY 3 MARCH 2022 AT 1.30 PM, ZOOM ONLINE PLATFORM**

Present

Magnox Ltd

Mr Mark Blackley (Site Director)
Mrs Jill Callander (SSG Secretariat)
Mr Bill Hamilton (Director of Communications)
Mr Alasdair Jackson (Project Manager)
Ms Mair Jones (Socio Economic Lead)
Mr Sean Marshall (Magnox Communications)
Ms Laura Miles
Mr Reuben Phillips (Waste Manager, Hunterston A)

EDF (Hunterston B)

Ms Allison Adamson (Technical and Safety Mgr)
Ms Fiona McCall (External Comms Manager)
Mr Stuart McGhie - SSG Vice Chair
Mr Joe Struthers (Station Director)

Community Council Representatives

Mr Jamie Black (Largs CC)
Mrs Rita Holmes – SSG Chair (Fairlie CC)
Mr John Lamb (West Kilbride CC)
Mr John McHenery (Cumbrae CC)

SEPA

Mr Keith Hammond (Hunterston B)
Ms Melanie Hayes (Hunterston A)

North Ayrshire Council (NAC)

Cllr Robert Barr (Dalry and West Kilbride)
Ms Lesley Jeffery (Ayrshire Civil Contingencies Team)
Mr Stewart Mackenzie (Environmental Health)

ONR

Mr Stuart Fannin (Hunterston B)
Mr Bill Kings (Hunterston A)

NDA

Mr John McNamara (Head of Stakeholder Relations)
Mr David Wallace (Stakeholder Lead Scotland)

Scottish Government

Ms Diane Hamilton
Mr Martin Macdonald

Hunterston Estate

Mr Angus Cochran-Patrick

In Attendance

Ms Sheila Adams (Minutes)
Dave (Marick Communications)
Ms Helen Smith (Marick Communications)

Mr Frank Alexander (Member of Public)
Mr Arran Hewlett (Member of Public)
Mr Peter Roche (Member of Public)

Apologies

Ms Clare Bond (Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM))
Cllr Todd Ferguson (Dalry and West Kilbride)
Mr Bill Kings (ONR)
Mr William Jack (National Farmers Union Scotland)
Cllr Tom Marshall (North Coast and Cumbraes)
Mr Andy McDade (Trade Union Rep, Hunterston A)
Mr Ian Murdoch (Member of Public)

Ms Smith, representing Marick Communications, gave a short presentation on housekeeping rules and guidance for getting the best out of the meeting on the Zoom platform and advised that the meeting was being recorded, for minute-taking purposes only.

1. Chairman's Opening Remarks and Declarations of Interest

Mrs Holmes, Chair, welcomed everyone to the sixty third meeting of the Hunterston Site Stakeholder Group online. There were no declarations of interest.

Mrs Holmes thanked Mr Ian Dippie from Largs Community Council and Mr Graham Wallace from Cumbrae Community Council for their input at meetings and attendance at meetings representing their respective Community Councils. She welcomed new representatives to their first meeting – Mr Jamie Black for Largs Community Council and Mr John McHenery for Cumbrae Community Council. Mr Black and Mr McHenery introduced themselves.

Mrs Holmes welcomed Mr Joe Struthers, Hunterston B Station Director and Ms Allison Adamson, Technical and Safety Manager at Hunterston B station, who was attending to support Mr Struthers, who may have to leave the meeting early, and to input to the last item – Presentation on AGR Decommissioning. She also welcomed Mr Martin Macdonald from Scottish Government to support Ms Diane Hamilton on any Higher Activity Waste questions raised. Cllr Jim McEleny of Inverclyde Council and Chair of Scottish Councils Committee on Radioactive Substances (SCCoRS) was also expected to join the meeting. Mrs Holmes also welcomed members of the public – Mr Arran Hewlett and Mr Frank Alexander. Mr Alexander introduced himself as a former Trade Union representative for both Hunterston A and B stations.

2. Chair and Vice Chair Updates and Correspondence Magnox SSG Chairs and Vice Chairs Meeting – 11 February 2022

The Chair's report was issued by email to members in advance of the meeting and Mrs Holmes summarised this. The most significant event locally has been EDF's end of generation at Hunterston B. Mr Joe Struthers was welcomed as Station Director at Hunterston B as Mr Paul Forrest returns to Torness as Site Director. Monthly updates on decommissioning progress and socio economics have continued to take place with Hunterston A. The Chair and Vice Chair attended a site meeting to discuss plans for Kilwinning College North Ayrshire Future Skills Hub development. A visit to Lochshore Community Hub project at Glengarnock had to be cancelled due to adverse weather. The Chair and Vice Chair have attended three SSG Chairs and Vice Chairs meetings on zoom. Mrs Holmes was concerned about the limited membership and lack of Scottish representation on the Nuclear Legacy Advisory Forum (NuLEAF). She and the Vice Chair are not invited to these meetings as they are not Local Authority Councillors or Officers. There is Scottish representation in the form of Cllr Dryburgh from Dumfries and Galloway Council and Chapelcross SSG Chair; Cllr Jim McEleny of SCCoRS and Cllr Alex Gallagher, North Ayrshire Council. She was disappointed not to have been informed of this meeting or updated by Cllr Gallagher. Mrs Holmes thanked Mr Bill Hamilton for providing the meeting slides but this did not compensate for not being present to hear the full discussion. She has since met with Cllr McEleny and Mr Phil Matthews, CEO of NuLEAF to voice her concerns. Mrs Holmes noted the Local Authority elections to be held in May 2022, which may result in new Elected Members for the area. The Chair found the Scottish Nuclear Sites meetings, hosted by Scottish Government Radwaste Team, to be positive in bringing together all Scottish civil and Ministry of Defence nuclear sites, stakeholders and regulators. Mrs Holmes hoped that the next Site Stakeholder Group meeting on 3 June 2022 would be in person.

Mr McGhie noted outstanding queries from the previous meeting and asked when the Site Stakeholder Group might have sight of the Hunterston B Station Closure Economic Report by North Ayrshire Council and receive a definition of 'near site, near surface'.

Mr McNamara clarified that EDF, Magnox, the NDA and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) had offered the same presentation given to NuLEAF to the Chair of Magnox Chairs and Vice Chairs meeting, who should be able to report back to other Site Stakeholder Group members. He confirmed that he was happy to do a collective update.

3. Actions and Approval of Previous Minutes

The Minutes of the Site Stakeholder Group meeting, held on 2 December 2021, virtually on the Zoom platform, were proposed for approval by Mr John Lamb and seconded by Mrs Rita Holmes.

4. Hunterston B Station Reports

Hunterston B Report – Mr Joe Struthers, Ms Allison Adamson

Mr Struthers thanked the Chair for changing the agenda order to allow him to present first as he is on annual leave but felt it important to input to the meeting. He thanked the Chair for her kind words at the start of the meeting. Mr Struthers described the end of generation as the end of an era and an emotional day for the Station. It would be remiss of him not to pay tribute to the staff team and contract partners, who should be proud of an excellent performance. Reactor 3 is being prepared for defueling with a couple of plant modifications. Fuel handling and Reactor case handling safety cases are currently being reviewed by ONR. The flask corridor is being upgraded. EDF worked hard to support people through the transition from generation to defueling and was proud that 100% of employees who wished to remain on site had secured positions. 97% of staff had their aspirations met, either through redundancy or remaining on site, and 3% who requested redundancy were continuing on site for the timebeing. The process was subject to an independent review and fared well.

Mr Struthers left the meeting at 2.00 pm.

ONR Report – Mr Stuart Fannin

The ONR report for October - December 2021 issued with the meeting papers was taken as read. A key aspect for ONR was end of generation for Reactor 3 on 26 November 2021 and Reactor 4 on 7 January 2022. Mr Fannin formally recorded ONR's congratulations to Mr Struthers and his team on the successful period of final operation, acting both safely and compliantly. The Station had a very strong final period of performance. The Station was now preparing for defueling. There had been two inspections during the period: COMAH (Control of Major Accident Hazards) – reducing hazardous substances and inventories; and Licence Condition 7 – looking at the robustness of the learning process and experiences from incidents on site. As the station will be configuring changes to plant it is very important to extract as much learning as possible from events to learn going forward. Two notable events were reported during the period. One was a conventional health and safety event with an operative getting their hand trapped in a pressure test vessel, which prompted the Licence Condition 7 inspection. The second reported event was administrative, with an anomaly in nuclear material accounting records. There was a discrepancy between the Nuclear Material Accountancy Records System and local records and this was being followed up by the ONR's Safeguards Inspector. Regulatory Permissioning in quarter 4 related to permission to declassify reactor pressure boundary once the station formally enters its defueling phase.

The Project Assessment Report is available to view on the ONR website. Mr Fannin confirmed that the Station needs ONR's permission to shut down the reactors permanently and safely and begin defueling and the safety cases for this are currently being considered although no significant showstoppers are expected.

SEPA Report – Mr Keith Hammond

The report issued in advance of the meeting was taken as read. Mr Hammond highlighted points to note. The Radioactive Substances Regulation inspection took place on 18 February. The Station was in compliance with a few improvements required. Under Environmental Events, the Station lost control of 1,000-1,500 litres of lightly contaminated oil (tritium). This was captured in the lagoon and did not enter the environment. SEPA is liaising regularly with the site and still investigating. In October 2021, a gasket containing asbestos was misconsigned when going to Cyclife. This should have been recorded in paperwork but as Cyclife is authorised to receive this type of waste and the Station has taken robust action since, an Advisory letter was issued, being the lowest form of enforcement. SEPA has published its Compliance Assessment Scheme results for 2019 on its website, having now recovered documents lost in the cyber-attack.

Members Question and Answer Session

Mr Lamb asked if there had been any agreement on the availability of four flasks per day for defueling and asked if Sellafield will have the required flasks available. Ms Adamson replied that it will start with 2 flasks per week, not four per day. Mr Lamb asked how this would affect defueling. Ms Adamson responded that the rate of defueling will be managed through pond capabilities and timing and rate will be controlled. Mr Fannin added that his role is End of Generation Workstream Lead. As part of this role, ONR inspectors will look at the number of flasks needed as a whole. ONR is aware of the throughput and will work with EDF to increase capacity of the flasks. He added that Hunterston is the pilot scheme, in which the regulators are very interested and will be monitoring.

Mr Lamb asked if Hunterston B has agreement in place with Hunterston A site regarding an Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) store. Ms Adamson advised that agreement is not formally in place and options are still being worked through.

Mr McGhie commended the Station for having no compulsory redundancies and asked how many people left through voluntary redundancy and how many will remain on site. Ms Adamson did not have the figures in front of her but undertook to provide these. Mr Fannin added that staff numbers are subject to regulatory oversight. This is still under discussion and there is an Intervention Plan in place to address this. [ACTION – Ms Adamson to report numbers back to the group](#)

Mr McHenery was pleased to note that the tritium had been caught and asked if monitoring took place. Mr Hammond confirmed that the oil was captured within the lagoon and most was accounted for along the line and manholes. SEPA's routine annual monitoring system - Radioactivity in Food and the Environment (RIFE) report - looks at this and the Station has its own environmental monitoring programme. No sampling was taken from the Firth of Clyde as this would have been diluted but this will be monitored. Mr McHenery asked if it would be monitored for tritium, which Mr Hammond confirmed to be the case.

Mr Black was concerned that 1500 litres of oil had been released uncontrolled. This should not have happened and he asked for more detail on how it did happen. Mr Hammond appreciated members' concerns and undertook to report the outcome of investigations to future meetings.

Mrs Holmes asked what is involved in the permanent isolation of control rods. Ms Adamson explained that once rods are inserted into the reactor for the last time, a process is followed to ensure that they cannot be inadvertently removed. Mrs Holmes asked how long the isolation and draining down of the pressure vessel cooling system would take. Ms Adamson responded that this would take a number of weeks to complete.

Mrs Holmes asked Mr Fannin for more information on COMAH regulations and details of the hazards and substances to be removed in months or years. Mr Fannin replied that there is an Inventory / schedule of regulated hazardous substances, such as sulphuric acid, methane, etc. Once the station enters defueling, these substances are not required in such high quantities. He added that it is quite right to reduce both the nuclear and COSH and COMAH hazards going forward as this is no longer required so reduces the inventory in a safe way.

Mrs Holmes noted that nitrogen is held as a backup safety system for the reactors and asked Mr Fannin if this will still be required on site. Mr Fannin responded that the nitrogen plant will be isolated as it is not needed as a secondary shutdown or back-up system.

Mrs Holmes noted that, in the past, flasks from Fairlie Station had contaminated soil under the crane and asked if this was routinely monitored at Peel Ports. Ms Adamson was not able to respond to this question. [ACTION – Ms Adamson to report back](#)

Mrs Holmes asked if there was a reduction in risk in having the electrical supply interrupted. Ms Adamson replied that a grid connection will still be needed as the Station enters defueling. Mr Fannin agreed that there is less of a risk.

Mrs Holmes added the congratulations of the Site Stakeholder Group, the communities and herself to the Station on achieving such a high percentage of employee aspirations.

With regard to Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (REPPiR), Mrs Holmes noted it had been requested that Fairlie and Cumbrae communities were included in the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ) but this did not happen. Looking at North Ayrshire Council's Emergency Plans, she noted that most of it had been redacted and the Community Council had submitted a request to the Information Commissioner. She asked if anyone wished to comment on this or wait for a response from the Information Commissioner. Mr Fannin clarified that under REPPiR, the Station and the Local Authority have to prepare onsite and offsite Emergency Plans. A Hazard Evaluation and Consequence Assessment Report, produced as a result of the Station changing from operation to defueling, gives recommendations on the size of the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone. EDF is re-evaluating the Hazard Evaluation and Consequence Assessment Report. The report is not yet available and ONR is monitoring the development of the process. When the report is agreed, it will be issued to the Local Authority to decide on the DEPZ. Mr Fannin explained that it can be appropriate to stop the issue of potassium iodate tablets when the risk is no longer there. Mrs Holmes pointed out that there is so much redaction in the information available that it is difficult to know where to get full information. Ms Jeffery confirmed that North Ayrshire Council is dealing with the Information Commissioner and she was unable to comment further until a response has been received from the Information Commissioner.

Mrs Holmes had not realised that the oil was in a lagoon and asked Mr Hammond what a lagoon is. Mr Hammond explained that the lagoon is open-air and is on the other side of the road as the site is entered. It is a more engineered structure than previously, for surface water. A skimmer on top removes oil from water (from vehicles for example). The lagoon had fulfilled its purpose by containing the oil leak. Mrs Holmes asked the timeframe for the leak. Mr Hammond advised that early indications suggested that this occurred over a couple of days.

Mr McHenery asked what happened to the oil removed by the skimmers. Mr Hammond replied that this is being stored on site in the Low Level Waste (LLW) facility. Mr McHenery asked where it would be transferred to. Mr Hammond clarified that the best practicable means for this has still to be determined. Mr McHenery was concerned that a decision had not yet been made. Mr Hammond responded that this is a relatively common and contained occurrence and the oil has been secured to allow time to make decisions.

Mr Black asked about the methods of detritiating the solution and where this would be done. Mr Hammond advised there is no way to remove tritium and the oil would normally be sent to an authorised facility for incineration.

Public Forum

Mr Roche was pleased to note that most of the 480 employees continued to be employed but asked what had happened to the 250 contractors. Ms Adamson responded that the Station continues to work closely with contractors. She was not able to give specific numbers at the meeting but undertook to bring a more detailed report to the next meeting. [Action – Ms Adamson to report back](#)

Mrs Holmes thanked Ms Fiona McCall for her email regarding noise monitoring. Mrs Holmes thanked Hunterston B Station, ONR and SEPA for their reports and answering members' questions.

5. Hunterston A Site Reports

Hunterston A Reports – Mr Mark Blackley

The Hunterston A report was circulated with the meeting papers. Mr Blackley confirmed that Hunterston A continues to make good progress on the programme of work to Care and Maintenance. With regard to Covid and the Omicron variant, proactive measures have been taken, e.g. increasing social distancing, lateral flow testing at home, use of masks etc. Numbers on site have been low and it is likely that measures will be relaxed during March/April. Recent storms have not caused any significant damage on site. It is now 11 months since the last Lost Time Accident on site. An EHSS&Q review by Magnox Executive Team on 16 February was successful, with positive feedback and no significant concerns. The target for waste retrieval from Solid Active Waste Bunker Retrieval (SAWBR) and Wet Intermediate Level Waste Retrieval and Encapsulation Plant (WILWREP) had been increased from 46 tons to 53 tons to 62 tons. It is anticipated that 70 tons will be reached by the end of the financial year, which is a truly exceptional achievement. Welfare facilities are being improved - kitchens, tea bars and toilets. Walkways and floor gratings on reactors are being replaced. The Learning and Development building is being demolished. Modifications are being made to the WILWREP plant to receive acids A new Pond Purge Sump sludge retrieval plant and effluent treatment plant are being installed. An extensive recruitment campaign is underway. Mr Blackley was pleased to report that for the first time in years, trainees are being recruited and four offers had been made and accepted. Mr Blackley shared a very short video of apprentices.

ONR Report

The ONR report was circulated with the meeting papers. Mr Kings sent apologies that he had had to leave the meeting due to technical issues but invited any questions to be sent on. Mrs Holmes noted that this would have been Mr Kings' last meeting as he is retiring at the end of April. She asked that the thanks of the Site Stakeholder Group and best wishes for an enjoyable retirement are passed to Mr Kings. [Action – Secretariat to write to Mr Kings conveying the thanks and best wishes of the Site Stakeholder Group.](#)

SEPA Report – Ms Melanie Hayes

SEPA's report on Hunterston A was circulated with the meeting papers. Monthly meetings continue with the site on Microsoft Teams. Corporate liaison meetings with Magnox are ongoing. Ms Hayes and Mr Fearn, Corporate Inspector, visited the site to inspect Solid Intermediate Level Waste Package Records, which was a follow-up from October. A presentation was requested on the totality of package records being retained on site. This was provided, with more follow-up to be done. Maintenance schedules were inspected earlier in the week during a joint inspection with ONR. There were no compliance issues but some procedural improvements could be made. An additional meeting was held on Best Practicable Means documentation to demonstrate compliance with Environmental Authorisations (Scotland) Regulations 2018 (EASR). A number of variations to the site permit are likely over the coming year. No compliance issues or environmental issues have been reported to SEPA.

Members Question and Answer Session

Referring to the Solid Intermediate Level Waste Encapsulation (SILWE) project, Mr Lamb asked if the site is going ahead with grouting operations on the first box. Mr Blackley responded that this had been done and simulated as there was no radioactive material in place. Mr Lamb was concerned that the boxes have been in the store for 5-7 years and the material in the boxes will have settled considerably and asked if this makes a significant difference to the process. Mr Phillips responded that there will be some settling but the grouting process should still penetrate to the bottom of the box and Magnox has corporately been seeking advice from Radioactive Waste Management Ltd. There are no concerns and processes will be in place to test the success during the active commissioning process.

Mr Lamb asked about reactor remedial repairs due to water damage. He was concerned about salt contamination on steel corroding it away. Mr Blackley advised of a comprehensive Civil Inspection programme. It is not unusual for steelwork of this age to be degraded and it has been identified early. Mr Lamb referred to windows being corroded and steel degrading for 25 years and hoped that this would be made safe. Mr Blackley confirmed that this is the purpose of the Civil Inspection programme and that £150k had been authorised for the inspection programme.

Mr Lamb asked if the contamination in the Learning and Development Centre building demolition was identified and cleared. Mr Blackley responded that this was out of scope material, with low level activity. The building has been knocked down and the area enclosed and remediation will be determined afterwards.

Referring to SAWBR, Mr Lamb asked if any more fuel element finds had been made. Mr Blackley replied that this was not the case.

With regard to ponds Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) retrieval and SAWBR, Mr Lamb asked if there were new transport flasks for transporting ILW from the pond buildings to bunkers. Mr Blackley explained the process of the solid intermediate level waste route, with the flasks safely transferring waste from ponds to bunkers then retrieved into three cubic metre boxes.

Mrs Holmes asked about the current NDA Decommissioning Strategy of completion of Care and Maintenance in 2030 and when there would be more detail on plans and the timetable. Mr Hamilton explained that the current plan is Care and Maintenance but there is a big change proposed for the ten Magnox Reactor Stations, which will move away from Care and Maintenance to a bespoke strategy for each site, through a rolling programme of decommissioning.

This change requires funding to be made available from the UK Government to BEIS to NDA to

Magnox. Discussions are taking place now, with a key meeting in April when it is hoped that BEIS officials will approve the Rolling Programme and funding. On the assumption that BEIS approve the rolling programme and funding required, which should contain dates, this will then be a Treasury decision with Government Minister / Secretary of State approval expected in late May / early summer. The finer detail is still to be worked out but major milestones are expected in the summer. Mr Blackley added that this is challenging but a good opportunity, with good employment opportunities.

Mr Black was concerned that a Strategy has still not been agreed at this stage, despite having known the position for decades. Mr Hamilton reiterated that the current strategy of Care and Maintenance (for Hunterston A) has been the strategy for decades. This would see the site taken back and fences put up until several decades later when new people would come back and finish off the job. The proposed new strategy has yet to be agreed so the site is still working to the existing strategy of Care and Maintenance. Mr Blackley reiterated the current strategy of retrieving the waste into secure packages, grouting them in stores, knocking down buildings, leaving just five storage buildings on site by 2030 and coming back 60 years later to demolish. The proposed new strategy, if approved, would remove the 60-year gap.

Mrs Holmes referred to a discussion with Hunterston A site with regard to an induction process for new members. It was agreed that this should be delayed until June in case there are new Local Authority member representatives after the elections. Mr McHenery agreed that induction training would be useful. [ACTION – Jill Callander to arrange for a new members induction following the elections in May for any new SSG members.](#)

Mr McHenery referred to Mr Blackley's description of five buildings on site in 2030 and materials stored for hundreds of years and asked when completion of the site-specific strategies is likely. Mr Blackley advised that under the current strategy, materials can be stored for 300 years. He added that the Reactors and ponds facilities would be dismantled.

Mrs Holmes congratulated Mr Blackley and his team on the positive feedback from Magnox Executive Team on the EHSS&Q review and also congratulated the site on the new apprenticeships. Mrs Holmes asked if there was potential vulnerability of standards due to having new employees and asked if there were any areas of concern in respect of fire safety. Mr Blackley advised that there is a maintenance programme and a general overview of all arrangements with specific inspections of reactors and SILWE.

Mrs Holmes pleased to hear of the upgrading of welfare facilities and asked if these would also accommodate Hunterston B employees. Mr Blackley replied that it could be 3-4 years before the two sites come together and it is still to be decided on which facilities will be shared. Mr Hamilton added that the upgrading of welfare facilities is being done across the Magnox estate. Oldbury Technical Centre has been closed. Magnox's Bristol Hub and the Horizon offices at Wylfa are all being refurbished for 'smarter working', making them fit for a 21st century modern office working environment.

Mrs Holmes commented that she would like to see the five redundant vaults removed and would like to see this included in the strategy. Mrs Holmes asked about the sludge in the pond purge sump encapsulation plant going to a different location. Mr Blackley replied a new encapsulation plant is being built to capture the sludge / concrete slurry in the pond purge sump. This is mixed with grout into a canister then into a waste package then stored. This is similar to other sludge retrievals on site but using a different location and equipment.



Mrs Holmes asked how the dumper bot will fit into the WILWREP inner tent. Mr Blackley explained that this would be lowered into the tank and can pick up sludge and solid objects and separate for retrieval. This is a new innovative piece of equipment that has been designed.

Mrs Holmes asked what the west stop harbour workshop is. Mr Blackley advised that this is an area within the pond facility.

Mrs Holmes asked if the new effluent and treatment plant would be above or below ground. Mr Blackley confirmed that this would be above ground.

Mrs Holmes asked for more information on the employee engagement survey and access for training needs. Mr Blackley responded that this was an online survey intended to seek views to build up a picture and identify areas for improvements, such as facilities, training, development, etc. Magnox and Hunterston rate highly in surveys but there is always room for improvement.

Mrs Holmes believed that the Civil Nuclear Constabulary was thinking about diversifying into private firms to work. She understood that jobs are difficult to recruit and retain as they are shift work and repetitive. Nobody from the Civil Nuclear Constabulary was present to comment on this.

Mrs Holmes asked Ms Hayes if the package records which eventually go to the storage facility in Thurso will be an ongoing process or will go as one complete package at the end. Ms Hayes could not answer on the detail but noted the importance of correct records being stored for the lifetime of the waste. Mr Hamilton clarified that the national storage facility is in Wick, not Thurso.

Public Forum

Mr Roche asked if the report on the Business Case for each site would be made public, including dates. He also asked if staff will be expected to move from one site to another if it is on a rolling programme. Mr Hamilton responded the Business Cases themselves would not be made public but information regarding dates etc will be public. He reassured members that the NDA and Magnox will be proactive in talking to stakeholders and will embrace the opportunity to tell the story of the future.

6. NDA Reports – Mr David Wallace

Mr Wallace updated on the NDA position with Covid measurements. An invite / placeholder for the NDA Stakeholder Summit will be issued soon. This will be on 7/8 September 2022 in Edinburgh, possibly in the Sheraton Hotel, as was intended before Covid. The National Audit Office report on the decommissioning of Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGRs) was issued on 28 January 2022, looking at the agreement between BEIS, EDF, NDA and Magnox. The NDA's Chief Executive attended the Public Accounts meeting on 7 February 2022. The report makes interesting reading and explores the Value for Money approach. Nuclear Waste Services Ltd was launched on 31 January 2022. Mr Wallace was pleased to hear the discussion on skills and thought it was timely to see Mr Blackley's video on apprenticeships. The NDA has invested £0.5M in Kilwinning Campus and he thanked the Chair and Vice Chair for attending the meeting there. The NDA has beacon projects focussing on realising opportunities and solving challenges. The three key Beacon projects include Sustainability; Skills; and Social Value. Mr Wallace referred to the question by the Vice Chair on North Ayrshire Council's Economic Report and undertook to chase this up with North Ayrshire Council. [Action – Mr Wallace to chase up Hunterston B Station Closure Economic Report being produced by North Ayrshire Council.](#)

7. Update from Scottish Government – Ms Diane Hamilton, Mr Martin Macdonald

The report issued with meeting papers was taken as read. The focus of the Higher Activity Waste (HAW) Policy Review is the implementation of the 2011 policy and the Higher Activity Radioactive Waste strategy in 2016. Firstly, a Technical Workstream will be undertaken with NDA to develop thinking around the 'near surface near site' concept and better understand the radioactive waste inventory in Scotland and consider the issues and challenges in the 2016 strategy. Ms Hamilton undertook to continue to engage with members of the Site Stakeholder Group collectively. Mr Martin Macdonald was also on the call to answer any questions specific to the HAW Report.

Members Question and Answer Session

Mrs Holmes referred to 'near site, near surface' disposal and had been told by an Ecologist that Hunterston A is not suitable for 'near site, near surface'. She stressed that the Site Stakeholder Group wishes to be engaged and involved in discussions. Mr Macdonald assured members that, as plans develop, Scottish Government will develop a robust stakeholder engagement plan, focussing on the needs of the community, and could also arrange specific workshops for the area.

Mrs Holmes thanked Scottish Government for responding to the questions sent in on the Policy and Strategy. Mr Macdonald invited members to make contact by email with any other questions.

8. Presentation on Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGR) Decommissioning – Mr Alastair Walker, Ms Allison Adamson, Mr John McNamara

Mr Walker, Magnox; Ms Adamson, EDF Hunterston B and Mr McNamara (NDA) gave a combined presentation on AGR Decommissioning. Mr McNamara summarised the Overview; The AGR Decommissioning Agreement; Roles and Responsibilities; Governance; Socio-Economics and Skills. Ms Adamson covered EDF's Nuclear Decommissioning Mission; EDF's Defueling Programme; End of Generation Timescales; What is the Defueling Process: Hunterston B Defueling; Working With Our People. Mr Walker finished the presentation by discussing: Context – The Future for Magnox; What the Revised AGR Decommissioning Arrangements Mean for Us and Our Next Steps; Our Approach; Strategic Alignment Between NDA, Magnox and EDF.

Members Question and Answer Session

Mrs Holmes was interested in reconfiguration within the store for taking Hunterston B station waste and will be interested to hear more about this in due course.

Mr Fannin commented on the interaction with regulators from the last presentation. ONR recognises the benefits of working collaboratively with EDF and Magnox. With respect to the decision made to the use of Hunterston A and Hinkley Point's ILW stores, he considered that the regulators have not been sufficiently engaged in the process to date. It is recognised that this is new work which has not been done before in terms of governance and there needs to be more engagement with the regulators where strategic decisions are being made and the regulators are kept fully aware as there needs to be absolute clarity at all times who is responsible for a particular activity. Mr Fannin made a plea that where Senior Strategic Committee is required that there is further effort to improve dialogue and engagement with the regulators, both ONR and the Environment Agency. Mr Fannin recognised that there have been improvements made in this regard but more are needed to ensure that the regulators are fully sighted and can influence the direction of travel of this work.

Mr Hamilton and Mr Blackley left the meeting at 4.00 pm.

Mrs Holmes was concerned to hear Mr Fannin's comments. Mr Walker undertook to take back Mr Fannin's concerns. He noted that this is a change in strategic planning assumption and will ensure going forward that engagement is made more widely with stakeholders and regulators.

Public Forum

Mr Roche asked why Dungeness is third on the list and not first, when it closed first. He noted that it was estimated to take ten years to defuel, which is longer than Hunterston. As an aside, he also noted that the Nuclear Liabilities Fund website is currently not working.

Ms Adamson responded to Mr Roche's initial question. Hunterston B has been aware of likely end dates for end generation and end defueling for some time and has been preparing for this for a number of years. Dungeness did not have the same time for planning in advance. Safety cases are being prepared now. Mrs Holmes believed that Hunterston is in a better and fit state to go ahead than Dungeness. Mr Black considered this to be a politician's response and thought that issues and conditions around the Station are more likely to be the reason than lack of planning and preparation. Ms McCall confirmed that it is a combination of the two, with Dungeness having bigger reactors and a different fuel route arrangement so would always have taken longer to defuel.

Mr Black asked how the Site Stakeholder Group and public can ensure that decisions made are for the best and have confidence that they will work. Mr McNamara referred to the Governance slide and stressed that a huge amount of work has been put in to provide a framework of the right people for the transition. The emphasis is on governance between the three key parties who will work collaboratively. Mr Wallace urged Mr Black to look at the National Audit Office's website where the Report is published. Some of the issues being raised are included in that report. Mr Wallace suggested that members read that report and come back with any further questions. The report is entitled 'Decommissioning of AGR Power Stations'. Mrs Holmes was confident that the ONR and SEPA have good officers who will hold people to account.

Mr Alexander was aware from the media of the NDA and Magnox's excellent socio economics in the area. He considered publicity on EDF involvement to be missing and asked if an EDF Socio Economic Scheme existed or how it will contribute to community efforts. Ms McCall responded that each EDF site has a Discretionary Fund, with applications made to sites and determined on a case-by-case basis. She added that part of the work being done is to see how to align EDF's corporate responsibility to NDA and Magnox going forward but there will be no immediate change. Mr Alexander pointed out that Magnox and NDA's socio-economic activity and support for community efforts is well-known and publicised where EDF funds seem to be kept secret, with no apparent publicity or transparency. He asked how people apply, where they apply to, and what level of amounts are distributed, none of which appears to be commonly known. He suggested that EDF should be publicising this information and encouraging people to apply. Ms McCall thanked Mr Alexander for his feedback and will look into it. Mrs Holmes thought that EDF had produced reports of socio-economic activity in the past. Mr McGhie was aware that there used to be some local groups requesting funding but he had now retired and did not know the current situation. Mr Alexander thought some people knew about the funding previously or through work but it was not common knowledge.

Mrs Holmes suggested that voting members had a zoom meeting before the next formal Site Stakeholder Group meeting. Mr Black would prefer such meetings to be in the evening. Mrs Holmes reminded members of the structure of the Site Stakeholder Group, being: five Local Authority representatives; five Community Council representatives; one Trade Union representative from each site; National Farmers Union Scotland and Hunterston Estate.

Mr McNamara left the meeting at 4.15 pm.

- Action – Secretariat to set up Zoom meeting for Site Stakeholder Group voting members in the near future.

8. Any Other Business

There were no other items of business raised.

9. Next Meeting – Wednesday 1 June 2022

Mr Lamb noted the typo on the Agenda, giving the next meeting as Thursday 1 June, when 1 June is a Wednesday. Mrs Callander apologised for this error and confirmed that the meeting would be held one day earlier than normal due to the Queen's Platinum Jubilee celebrations on Thursday 2 June.

The date of the next meeting was confirmed as **Wednesday 1 June 2022**, face to face at **The Waterside Hotel, West Kilbride**, unless Covid restrictions at the time determine otherwise.

Mrs Holmes thanked everyone for taking part in the online meeting and hoped to see everyone at the next meeting. Cllr Barr commented that he would have to be re-elected first at the local authority elections in May and noted that he had been attending meetings for 17 years.

The Chair brought the meeting to a close at 4.18 pm.

Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR)

Site Report for Hunterston B

Report for period 1 January to 31 March 2022

Foreword

This report is issued as part of ONR's commitment to make information about inspection and regulatory activities relating to the above site available to the public. Reports are distributed to members for the Hunterston B Site Stakeholder Group (SSG) and are also available on the ONR website (<http://www.onr.org.uk/llc/>).

Site inspectors from ONR usually attend Hunterston SSG meetings where these reports are presented and will respond to any questions raised there. Any person wishing to inquire about matters covered by this report should contact ONR.

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1. Inspections

1.1 Dates of inspection

The ONR site inspector, supported by specialist inspectors, made inspections on the following dates during the report period 1 January to 31 March 2022:

- 2 - 3 February 2022
- 16 - 17 March 2022
- 30 March 2022

ONR's civil nuclear security inspector usually undertakes quarterly inspections at Hunterston B:

- The site security inspector carried out an inspection on the 8 – 9 March 2022.

2. Routine Matters

2.1. Inspections

Inspections are undertaken as part of the process for monitoring compliance with:

- the conditions attached by ONR to the nuclear site licence granted under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (NIA65) (as amended);
- the Energy Act 2013;
- the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA74); and
- regulations made under HSWA74, for example the Ionising Radiations Regulations 2017 (IRR17), the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (MHSWR99), the Radiation Emergency Preparedness and Public Information Regulations 2019 (REPPPIR) and The Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations 2009 (CDG);
- The Fire (Scotland) Act 2005;
- The Nuclear Industries Security Regulations (NISR) 2003;
- The Nuclear Safeguards (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (NSR19).

The inspections entail monitoring the licensee's actions on the site in relation to incidents, operations, maintenance, projects, modifications, safety case changes and any other matters that may affect safety. The licensee is required to make and implement adequate arrangements under the conditions attached to the licence in order to ensure legal compliance. Inspections seek to judge both the adequacy of these arrangements and their implementation.

In this period, routine inspections of station covered the following:

- Conventional health and safety.
- NISR2003 – Nuclear Security.
- LC22 – Modification or experiment on existing plant.

During the reporting period, ONR judged the arrangements made and implemented by the site in response to safety requirements to be satisfactory in the areas inspected. Where improvements have been identified, the licensee has made a commitment to address those issues, and ONR inspectors will closely monitor progress during future site inspections. Where necessary, ONR will take formal regulatory enforcement action to ensure that appropriate remedial measures are implemented to reasonably practicable timescales.

Members of the public, who would like further information on ONR's inspection activities during the reporting period, can view site Intervention Reports at www.onr.org.uk/intervention-records on our website www.onr.org.uk. Should you have any queries regarding our inspection activities, please email contact@onr.gov.uk.

Conventional health and safety – On the 2 - 3 February the specialist conventional health and safety inspector carried out an inspection against the management of asbestos containing materials (ACMs) and the health and safety management of construction work. The inspector was satisfied that the station had formally appointed a suitably qualified asbestos coordinator, and that station is reviewing where end of generation (EOG) may impact on ACM locations and is planning appropriately. An industrial safety advisor is embedded within the construction project delivery team. The inspector judged that the ACM management arrangements and management arrangements for construction work were adequate and a rating of Green (no formal action) was allocated.

NISR2003 – On the 8 – 9 March the site security inspector carried out an inspection against the site security plan. Whilst the inspector was satisfied with the site security plan for defuelling operations, some areas for improvement were identified. The security inspector is currently following up on these areas.

LC 22 – On the 30 March specialist electrical safety inspectors carried out an inspection of the programme of work to isolate the controls rods within Reactor 3. During the pre-defuelling outage, the control rods are physically and electrically isolated in order to permanently shut down the reactor. The inspectors observed the isolation and disconnection of a sample of the bulk group rods by isolation from the electrical supplies within the control cabinets and the removal of fuses. The disconnection of the control rod clutch mechanisms were verified and the procedures and quality plans, used by staff to carry out the work were sampled. Based upon the observed isolations, the information provided and from discussions with operations staff, the electrical inspectors were satisfied with the arrangements and with the isolations of the control rods that had been completed. A further inspection is planned to verify the isolations of the remaining control rods.

Annual review of safety (AROS) – On the 16 – 17 March the superintending and nominated site inspectors attended the AROS meeting. ONR recognised the excellent generating performance of the station over its final 12 months of operation and welcomed the investment that station has made in the fuel route facilities, which will permit efficient defuelling. A key area of focus, on configuration control of retired plant and identification of plant remaining in service, was noted along with the developing programme of work to prepare the station for deconstruction activities post transfer to the NDA.

In addition to our routine compliance inspections, ONR inspectors also inspect operating reactors against safety-related systems. Each site has a safety case that demonstrates how it operates safely. For advanced gas cooled reactors, each of approximately fifteen key systems are inspected against the claims made upon them by the safety case. The aim is to systematically inspect all the significant safety related systems within a five-year cycle (three per year). ONR believes that this will provide more robust assurance of the site's safe operation and how the safety case is being implemented.

- There were no system-based inspections during the reporting period.

ONR also carries out themed inspections which seek to evaluate the effectiveness and consistency of implementation of the licensee's processes and procedures. These inspections are carried out at the site, across the EDF fleet and, in some cases across other licensees.

- There were no theme inspections during the reporting period.

2.2 Other work

The site inspector held periodic meetings with safety representatives and the EDF internal regulation team, to support their functions of representing employees and receiving information on matters affecting their health, safety and welfare at work and to provide internal challenge on nuclear safety matters.

3. Non-Routine Matters

Licensees are required to have arrangements to respond to non-routine matters and events. ONR inspectors judge the adequacy of the licensee's response, including actions taken to implement any necessary improvements.

Licence Condition (LC) 7 requires licensees to make and implement adequate arrangements for the notification, recording, investigation and reporting of incidents occurring on the site. During this period, the site inspector reviewed incidents that met the criteria for routine reporting to ONR. The site and specialist inspectors also sampled the station's follow up reports and corrective actions. From the evidence sampled, the inspector was satisfied that the events reported during the period, had

been adequately investigated and appropriate event recovery actions identified. Matters and events of particular note during the period were:

- On 20 December 2021, station reported a discrepancy with Nuclear Material Accountancy records applied to Flux Detectors, which contain a small quantity of non-fuel fissile material (NFFM). Whilst it was determined that no quantity of nuclear material had been lost, the ONR Safeguards criteria for reporting unexpected losses or gains of NFFM are precise and were not met by the station. In response the ONR Safeguards inspector wrote to the station to ensure that further potential unexpected losses or gains of fissile material are reported in a timely manner.
- On 12 January, smoke was reported coming from a paper shredder van belonging to a contractor, whilst it was on site. The site fire team deployed and Scottish Fire and Rescue service attended site. Water was applied to the van and it was confirmed there was no further potential for a fire to occur. The event was not due to waste materials from the station.
- On 17 February, during recommissioning of the flask handling crane within the Flask Corridor, it was revealed that the crane switches did not operate within the limits specified by the safety case. Commissioning was halted and the crane was made safe. No worker or member of the public was at risk as nuclear material was not being handled. It was determined that the event arose due to a failure of the original pond and flask handling safety case to adequately specify limits and conditions for the crane interlocks. The ONR site inspector was satisfied with the test and commissioning arrangements that had identified the event and with the appropriate actions to update the safety case and interlock testing requirements.
- On 29 March, it was reported that a battery forming part of the 50V Direct Current (DC) essential supply system had been incorrectly isolated in order to perform a maintenance activity. The 50V DC supply system supports alarms and indications to the Central Control Room (CCR) and supports the remote control of plant from within the CCR. It's availability and operation is therefore controlled by operating rules and the isolation of the 50V battery resulted in an unplanned entry to an action condition. There was adequate redundancy in the essential supply system and thus there was no risk to nuclear safety. The event is currently being investigated and the learning from this event will be applied to the station configuration control programme.

End of generation at Hunterston B.



- On 26 November 2021 Reactor 3 ceased operating after its final period of safe and compliant operation. Reactor 3 is currently undergoing its pre defuelling outage. Reactor 4 ceased operating on the 7 January 2022 and was safety shutdown with all required post trip cooling established. Reactor 4 will commence defuelling once Reactor 3 has been defuelled.

4. Regulatory Activity

ONR may issue formal documents to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. Under nuclear site licence conditions, ONR issues regulatory documents, which either permit an activity or require some form of action to be taken; these are usually collectively termed 'Licence Instruments' (LIs) but can take other forms. In addition, inspectors may take a range of enforcement actions, to include issuing an Enforcement Notice.

- The following LIs, Enforcement Notices and Enforcement letters have been issued during the period:

Table 1: Licence Instruments and Enforcement Notices Issued by ONR during this period

Date	Type	Ref. No.	Description
21/03/22	Licence Instruments	LI 571	ONR agreed to the implementation of the Defuelling Essential Shutdown Reactor Safety Case.
		LI 572	ONR agreed to the implementation of the Defuelling Fuel Handling Safety Case.
			These licence instruments permit Hunterston B to complete its pre-duelling outage and to then commence defuelling. The basis for ONR's decision is provided at ONR-OFD-PAR-21-009.

Reports detailing regulatory decisions can be found on the ONR website at <http://www.onr.org.uk/pars/>.

5. News from ONR

For the latest news and information from the Office for Nuclear Regulation, please read and subscribe to our regular email newsletter 'ONR News' at www.onr.org.uk/onrnews

6. Contacts

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Hunterston Site Stakeholder Group

SEPA Update- Hunterston B

1 June 2022

Chief Executive's Post

Recruitment for a new Chief Executive has commenced, and depending on the availability of the chosen candidate, is expected to be filled in the next six months. In the interim, Jo Green will continue as Acting Chief Executive, supported by SEPA's Agency Management Team.

Cyber-Attack

On 24 December 2020, we were subject to a serious and complex cyber-attack, displaying significant stealth and malicious sophistication, which significantly impacted our organisation, our staff, our public and private partners, and the communities who rely on our services.

Since the attack, we have worked with Scottish Government, Police Scotland, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and the Scottish Business Resilience Centre (SBRC), to a clear recovery strategy.

We've published [Our response and recovery from a major cyber-attack](#), and a range of voluntary independent audit reports on our response and recovery from Police Scotland, the Scottish Business Resilience Centre and Azets. You can view these reports at sepa.org.uk/cyber-attack.

We will continue to publish the weekly service status until all our services have resumed, continuing to support our organisation, our staff, our public and private partners, and the communities who rely on our services, as we continue our recovery.

Regulation

Environmental Authorisations (Scotland) Regulations 2018 (EASR)- radioactive substances

Telephone communication with the station has continued throughout the period, including formal weekly call-downs with the Environmental Safety Group as well as monthly updates from the EDF internal regulator on site. Routine meetings with corporate EDF, ONR and EA on strategic issues, including defueling and decommissioning, have also taken place.

The site has been visited twice since the last SSG meeting. SEPA staff attended the Annual Review of Safety on 17 March 2022 and afterwards received updates on the investigation into the radioactive oil loss event. On 26 April 2022, SEPA staff carried out an inspection to follow up on progress with both the radioactive and non-radioactive oil loss events as well as the recommendations from the inspection on 22 February 2022. No new contraventions were identified, and it was noted that the recommendations from February had been acted upon.

The station applied in July 2020 to regularise the receipt of radioactive waste in the form of debris in the incoming fuel transport flasks. Work continues to progress on determining the application.

Pollution Prevention and Control (PPC)

SEPA staff have been investigating and assessing the leak from an oil-filled cable onsite- see below. Otherwise, there have been no issues relating to the station's PPC permit for its non-radioactive emissions from the emergency diesel generators, auxiliary boilers and waste oil burner since the last scheduled SSG meeting.

Control of Major Accidents and Hazards (COMAH)

There have been no issues related to COMAH since the last scheduled SSG meeting.

Controlled Activities Regulations (CAR)

There have been no other issues relating to the stations' non-radioactive liquid discharges to the water environment since the last scheduled SSG meeting.

UK Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)

There have been no issues relating to the ETS since the last scheduled SSG meeting.

Environmental Events

SEPA is currently investigating two environmental events on site, both of which involve the loss of control of oil:

1. In February, the station lost control of approximately 1300 litres of radioactively contaminated oil from a gas circulator settling tank. The oil is lightly contaminated with tritium. The oil appears to have been captured at the lagoons at the 39-inch outfall and did not enter the environment. The recovered waste oil/water mixture has been allowed to separate, with the water fraction being disposed of through the AETP and the oil being transferred to an authorised incinerator. The event remains under investigation.
2. EDF have made SEPA aware of a small, ongoing non-radioactive oil leak from an oil-filled transformer cable. The leak constitutes about 50 litres per quarter of fully biodegradable oil which has a half-life of around 15 days in soil. There is no reason at present to assume a significant environmental impact. SEPA is in discussions with EDF regarding locating the oil leak, establishing monitoring to assess its extent and putting plans in place to implement a fix. This will need to be carefully considered and planned due to the need to take the transformer offline, which has nuclear safety implications, to instigate the fix.

Radioactivity in Food & the Environment (RIFE)

RIFE is a collaborative report on work carried out by SEPA, the other UK environment agencies, Food Standards Scotland and Food Standards Agency on the radiological monitoring of food and the environment. The RIFE reports aim to provide an in-depth assessment of radioactivity in food and the environment in the UK and the public's exposure to radiation, including in the vicinity of Hunterston B. The RIFE report incorporates the results from the analysis of a wide range of samples and key information on local habits to demonstrate both that food remains safe and that the public's exposure to ionising radiation is within legal limits.

The latest edition (RIFE 26) covering 2020 has been published and can be obtained from SEPA's website along with previous year's reports. RIFE 26 reports that the total dose for the representative person (most exposed) around the Hunterston site, which includes both Hunterston A and Hunterston B, for 2020 was 0.005 millisieverts, which is well below the legal annual dose limit of 1 millisievert as set out in paragraph 26, Schedule 8 of EASR19.

Scottish Pollutant Release Inventory (SPRI)

The Scottish Pollutant Release Inventory (SPRI) is a publicly accessible electronic database of releases of pollutants to all environmental media and transfers of non-radioactive waste. SEPA intends that, as far as practicable, SPRI be the principle means by which information on Scottish pollutant releases and non-radioactive waste transfers is collected and made public. Wherever possible, such information will be collected and presented by this one system. The data for 2019, including that from Hunterston A and B, have been published and are available on SEPA's website under "*Environment/Environmental data/SPRI*".

Mr Keith Hammond

Radioactive Substances Specialist

20 May 2022



HUNTERSTON A

SITE STAKEHOLDER GROUP REPORT

SITE DIRECTOR – MARK BLACKLEY

JUNE 2022

HUNTERSTON A
SITE DIRECTOR'S REPORT TO THE SITE STAKEHOLDER GROUP
JUNE 2022

Hunterston A continues to make good progress on our programme of work to Care and Maintenance. We continue to be adequately funded by the NDA and remain committed to addressing the nuclear liabilities at Hunterston A in a safe, secure manner with care for the environment.

1 SITE DIRECTOR OVERVIEW

Hunterston A site is part way through its Care and Maintenance Preparations (C&MP) phase of decommissioning which, subject to NDA approval and funding, is currently forecast to complete by October 2030 based on the current decommissioning strategy.

The site was impacted by positive cases of Covid 19 but remained safe and compliant and delivered planned work activity. The site's Covid secure arrangements have been further relaxed in line with Government advice.

Conventional Safety Performance on site remains good. The site has continued to safely deliver work on site with no Lost Time Accidents (LTA's) since March 2021.

There were no significant Nuclear / Radiological Safety or Security issues over the reporting period.

There was one Environmental event following the discovery of a small hole in one of the sites authorised gaseous discharge stacks during a planned inspection. Upon discovery of the defect the associated ventilation plant was switched off and a repair to the stack was carried out. No other similar defects were identified on other discharge stacks.

There has been some excellent progress in a number of areas during the reporting period;

- *The Higher Activity Waste team retrieved in excess of 71Te of Intermediate Level Waste to the Store during 2021/22 financial year. It is forecast that the bulk retrieval of waste from Bunker 1 should be completed by late summer 2022.*
- *The demolition of the Learning and Development centre was completed.*
- *The installation and in-active commissioning of a new Effluent Treatment Plan was completed.*
- *A number of Asset Management improvements were completed including upgrades to security and electrical systems, improved welfare facilities and repairs to buildings / roofs.*

Whilst there are ongoing recruitment challenges it is pleasing that Hunterston has filled 64 resource requests since April 2021, either by direct recruitment or conversion of agency workers onto Magnox New Starter contracts. Our key focus over the next few months will be starting the health physics trainees and the selection for the craft apprenticeships.

More details on some of these highlights are within the appropriate sections of this report.

2 SAFETY OVERVIEW

2.1 Safety Review Performance

Safety Performance on site remains good. The site has continued to safely deliver work on site with no Lost Time Accidents (LTA's). Thirteen months have passed since the last LTA on Hunterston A Site. The Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR) is now 0.00. The Site did however have three occasions where individuals received first aid treatment for minor injuries suffered during work activity. The injuries were a cut to finger, cut to leg and a graze to the head. After receiving treatment all returned to their daily tasks.

The site was impacted by positive cases of Covid 19 but remained safe and compliant and delivered planned work activity. Our Covid Contingency planning provided the site with the opportunity to appropriately respond to positive cases when they became apparent. The numbers of positive notifications to the site have greatly reduced and is now having a very minimal, if any impact on site.

The site's Covid secure arrangements have been further relaxed as we progress to exit the strict controls implemented due to the Covid pandemic. In line with government guidance and company policy we have revoked the site specific Covid arrangements and now work directly to the Company's revised document "Working and Living with Respirable Diseases including Covid – 19"

Any changes to the site's Covid Arrangements were discussed with site safety representatives and agreed at the site HESAC before implementation.

The sites Fire Life Safety Arrangements were inspected by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) Fire Inspectors. This inspection looked at the site's arrangements for fire life safety in general, also specifically at the Solid Intermediate Level Waste Encapsulation Plant and both Reactors on site. Some improvements opportunities were identified, and the site was deemed to have adequate Fire Life Safety arrangements.

The site's Fire Safety Management Group continue to meet bi-monthly and constantly review all aspects of Fire Life Safety arrangements and systems on site to ensure compliance and our Fire Life Safety arrangements are appropriate.

Target Zero continues to raise awareness on various topics such as Fire Safety, Mental Health and LOLER/PUWER.

The sites reporting culture remains strong and consistent. The site receives over 100 Q Pulse reports every month and each report is assessed/reviewed at the daily safety and compliance meeting and categorisation screened at the weekly event review meeting.

The site safety representatives meet fortnightly at the Local Safety Forum and bi-monthly HESAC meetings. These meetings are well supported by Magnox and contractor Safety Representatives.

2.2 Emergency Arrangements

The sites Accident and Emergency Contingency Arrangements remain suitable and sufficient for work activities and foreseeable events that may or could occur through the undertaking of work activity on site. The Contingency arrangements are frequently tested to ensure they remain in a state of readiness.

New work activities are being undertaken on site that requires Contractors to be working at height. The Contractor involved had successfully demonstrated their ability to rescue/recover a person from height and provide first aid.

Contractors are responsible for ensuring that their Contingency arrangements remain suitable and ever ready. They test them frequently and Magnox are invited to oversee the training exercises.

The Security Guards continue to test the silent hours contingency arrangements.

The wellbeing group ran several Defibrillator and Resuscitation awareness training sessions. These sessions were well attended, and more sessions have been arranged. This is a life skill that can be taken away from the workplace.

3 DECOMMISSIONING PROGRESS

3.1 Hunterston Reactor Project / Plant & Structures

Reactor Remedial Repairs

The Reactor Remedial Repairs works programme has completed removal of all external cradle rails from both reactors and painting of exposed brackets, following the removal of the rails. Works to replace water damaged open floor gratings and durbar plates is now complete in both reactors. The remaining scope, which is to repair 27 column bases across both reactor buildings is continuing and is expected to be completed by July 2022.

Reactor Interim Roof Remedial Works

Works started on site in January 2022 with reassurance surveys and installation of safety netting to secure a system inside the reactors under the roofs as a fall arrest measure. The reassurance monitoring and internal safety netting is complete and work to access the fragile roof via a system of 'Easi-deck' walkways and installation of perimeter handrails by rope access is ongoing. Application of a SIKA waterproof coating to the facades of reactor one via a MEWP has also commenced. The main works to arrest water ingress to the roofs by applying a SIKA protection system, which is weather dependent, will continue on following completion of the fall arrest and edge protection works and is due to be completed by end of October 2022.

Learning and Development (L&D) Centre Demolition Works


Plant and Structures has completed a small-scale demolition project of the Learning and Development centre (L&D) at Hunterston A on time and to budget. The work consisted of demolishing the main L&D building and a number of small outbuildings, in addition to excavating and removing a buried septic tank. The project is currently in the close down phase.

3.2 Solid Active Waste Bunker Retrieval (SAWBR) Project

The SAWBR facility was constructed to recover solid HAW (Higher Activity Waste) from within the site's five HAW bunkers. This is achieved by using remotely operated vehicles (ROV's) to fill hoppers that are then tipped into RWM (Radioactive Waste Management Ltd) approved 3m³ stainless steel boxes. The initial breakthrough into Bunker 5 was achieved in March 2014 and Bunkers 5, 4, 3 and 2 have been sequentially emptied to date.

The plant was shut down to facilitate a routine planned, maintenance outage in SAWBR on week commencing Monday 2 May for a duration of two weeks. This outage was completed, and the plant has since been returned to service and continues to export filled boxes of waste.

Out-with the period of the outage the SAWBR facility continues to operate, processing waste from Bunker 1. To date, the SAWBR team have safely exported a cumulative total of Two Hundred and Twenty 3M³ boxes from Bunker 1 to the ILW Store, this equates to **132.4 Tonnes** of Bunker 1 waste. This brings the total of 3M³ boxes exported from SAWBR (all bunkers) to **1113 Boxes**. It is forecast that the bulk retrieval of waste from Bunker 1 should be completed by late summer 2022.



Bunker Waste Recovery Operations, showing a Brokk sorting waste from Bunker 1

3.3 Wet Intermediate Level Waste Retrieval & Encapsulation Plant (WILWREP)

The WILWREP facility was designed and constructed to recover and encapsulate Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) sludges, resins and acids stored in site tanks. The plant is now undergoing a reconfiguration to allow the processing of ILW Nitric acid, currently stored within the Acid Storage Facility. WILWREP operations personnel are assisting with these reconfiguration works and providing support as required to Waste Projects work on the Pond Purge Sump Retrieval and Encapsulation Plant (PPSREP) – which is being installed for retrieval of sludges at a different location on site.

When possible, the WILWREP team are continuing to consolidate the residual sludge from three Sludge Retention Tanks in WILWREP and one of the methods of consolidating the sludge, whilst segregating the debris, is with the use of the “Dumper Bot”.

Operations have now commenced on Dumper Bot recoveries in SRT3 (see picture opposite), moving the remaining sludge within the tank to a single location. The Bot will then be used to separate solid items of debris from the remaining sludge, allowing the team to clear the base of the tank. This work should take around two months, then the Dumper Bot will be transferred to SRT2 to continue the process.



3.4 Solid Intermediate Level Waste Encapsulation (SILWE) Project

The SILWE facility exists purely to encapsulate the 3M³ packages containing the solid waste retrieved/recovered from SAWBR with a grout mix. It is expected to take up to three years to encapsulate approximately 1500 stainless steel packages. Once encapsulated, the packages will be in their disposable state.

The SILWE Project continue with preparations for the commencement of Phase 2 Commissioning in August of 2022. Phase 2 will conclude with plant operations being managed via the SILWE control room.

Recently we have had a bit of a setback with the Kuka robot sequences. It is expected that a solution will be in place in the coming weeks. This will allow the system performance demonstration to progress.

The project plan is to transition into Phase 3 Commissioning in November of 2022, with Active Commissioning forecast to commence in the second quarter of 2024.



3.5 Ponds Programme

New Effluent treatment Plant (NEffTP)

Work to install a New Effluent Treatment Plant within the Low-Level Waste Transfer Facility at Hunterston A progressed throughout the reporting period. This system will facilitate the eventual diversion of current miscellaneous effluent streams which will in turn enable wider decommissioning of site by creating redundancy in the systems and tanks currently still in use.

JGC mobilised for Hunterston in February and Installation concluded at the end of March with inactive commissioning achieved in early April. The team are now focused on addressing minor actions from inactive commissioning activities whilst turning their attention to readiness for active commissioning later in the year.



New Effluent Treatment plant within the Low-Level Waste Transfer Facility.

Miscellaneous Effluent Bowsers

In a project related to the New Effluent Treatment Plant, FAT's were carried out within the period on the four miscellaneous effluent bowsers being procured from Trailer Engineering and the new kit has now been delivered to site.

These Bowzers (*pictured below*) will become the means of collecting effluent and transferring it to the NeffTP once the existing effluent streams have been diverted.


The bowzers will allow unmanned local collection of effluent and will integrate with the wider monitoring systems on-site to provide automatic warnings when reaching capacity.



Delay Tank Blockhouse Ventilation

The redundant delay tanks are located within the Radiological Control Area (RCA), between the Replacement Delay Tank (RDT) and the Wet Intermediate Level Waste Retrieval and Encapsulation Plant (WILWREP) and opposite to the Solid Active Waste Building (SAWB). There is currently no ventilation system for the delay tanks as it was removed historically due to degradation and as a result all decommissioning works associated with the tanks have been suspended.


Work to reinstate a ventilation system to the delay tanks is underway, which, when complete, will facilitate decommissioning. The design of the system has now concluded with manufacturing and installation drawings approved and the team are working towards achieving DAR 4 in the coming weeks before commencing procurement.



General Arrangement of Delay Tank enclosure and new ventilation system.

Ponds ILW Retrieval

During the period the Pond Operations team filled the SAW flask with ILW from the blockhouse and it was transferred to High Active Waste. This represents a key milestone in site ILW retrieval and overall hazard reduction within the pond and is the final time that the SAW flask will be required for use within the pond.



Photograph and drawing of Solid Active Waste Flask

4 ASSET MANAGEMENT

Asset Management forms a cornerstone of site operations to ensure the ongoing integrity of site assets during the lifecycle plan. The work also involves the disposal, remediation and repurpose of assets across the site. The aim is to work in partnership with others on Site to provide and maintain a safe and secure working environment. Areas on Site that fall within the scope of asset management include:

- *Physical infrastructure*
- *Installed and temporary plant and equipment*
- *Facilities*
- *Utilities*

A number of Work Packs were concluded at the end of the last financial year 2021/22 including upgrades to security and electrical systems, improved welfare facilities and roadways, removal of asbestos in aged equipment and repairs to building envelopes that are subject to harsh, coastal weather conditions.

Improvements for this financial year 2022/23 include:

- *Phase 2 of the welfare facilities upgrades.*
- *Ventilation system upgrades.*
- *Crane upgrades*
- *Replacement of the Sites Mains Supply Transformers*
- *Replacement of the Sites Waste Monitoring Equipment*
- *Remediation of building fabric and site infrastructure in support of current Business Plan*
- *Review of facilities to meet future Business demand and provide underpinning for Investment Plan where appropriate*


5 PEOPLE

5.1 Site HR

We have recently been reflecting on the level of resourcing that has been ongoing at Hunterston, which has been significant, with 64 resource requests having been fulfilled during April 2021 to date and a number of others currently in progress. This has resulted in refreshment in some areas; securing valuable agency workers onto Magnox New Starter contracts and assisted in improving our succession planning for the future as well as the socio-economic aspects. Our key focus over the next few months will be progressing the trainee positions within health physics disciplines that we have candidates identified for and commencing the selection of craft apprenticeships.

Trends from the feedback from the recent Employee Engagement Survey have now been identified and are being communicated in group sessions with staff across the site. These are in the areas of engagement, EDI and health and wellbeing. Following this, action plans will be developed to progress improvements

Our new Performance Management arrangements **Valuing Individual Performance (VIP)** were launched from April this year and line managers and team members are currently planning the first of these conversations under the new process. The principles of the VIP approach are summarised as CODE:



5.2 Occupational Health

Our Wellbeing Group continues to promote a variety of mental health and wellbeing initiatives across the site. Recent examples include the Hunterston Step Challenge, provision of information on organisations who provide emotional and practical support to those who have caring responsibilities; and Mental Health Awareness Week where the theme this year was loneliness. In support of this year's theme a variety of webinars from Care First being available to view as well as colleagues from across the NDA estate talking about their personal experiences in a collection of videos called "This is me"

With the recent reduction in Covid restrictions, there has also been a roll out of Defibrillator Familiarisation Sessions on the use of Automated External Defibrillator's (AED's) to provide an insight into how they work and allay any fears of using one.

6 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY

Explanatory note: The maximum permissible dose to a radiation worker in the UK is 20mSv (milliSieverts) in a calendar year. The average annual radiation dose to the UK population from all sources is 2.6mSv. Collective dose is usually measured in man.milliSieverts. For example, if ten people were each to receive 0.1milliSieverts during a particular task, then the collective dose for the task would be 10 people x 0.1mSv each = 1 man.milliSievert.

Doses for the calendar year 2022, to the end of April, are as follows:

- *Approximately 154 employees and visitors received a total collective dose of 4.637 man.mSv between them*
- *Approximately 215 contractors received a total collective dose of 6.071 man.mSv between them*
- *The highest individual dose received by an employee was 0.650 mSv*
- *The highest individual dose received by a contractor was 0.764 mSv*

The majority of dose accrued in 2022 has been from a combination of the pond decommissioning project and other site projects. All doses in these projects have been prior assessed, planned and are tracked throughout the project duration to ensure that no limits are exceeded and that doses are kept as low as reasonably practicable.

7 ENVIRONMENT (April 2021 - March 2022)

7.1 Radioactive Discharges

Solid

Low Level Waste (LLW) disposals to the Low Level Waste Repository (LLWR) continue. 91.88m³ of LLW and VLLW with a total activity of 1.7 GBq was disposed of during the twelve month period from April 2021 to March 2022. There is no limit on the volume or radioactivity content of LLW and VLLW being disposed of under the site EA(S)R Permit. The main contribution to these waste consignments was decommissioned plant, equipment, and materials generated during decommissioning operations.

Liquid

The main sources of liquid radioactive discharges during the period April 2021 - March 2022 were decontamination of various areas within the cartridge cooling ponds building, liquors generated through wet waste recovery and encapsulation processes, and routine waste water arisings from the site active drain system.

Radionuclide or Group of Radionuclides	Annual Limit	Activity discharged (Apr 2021 - Mar 2022)
Tritium	30 GBq	0.011 GBq
Caesium-137	160 GBq	0.060 GBq
Plutonium-241	2 GBq	0.003 GBq
All alpha emitting radionuclides not specifically listed taken together	2 GBq	0.003 GBq
All non-alpha emitting radionuclides not specifically listed taken together	60 GBq	0.057 GBq

Gaseous

The main contributions to gaseous radioactive discharges were ventilation systems operating in contamination-controlled areas and reactor vessel 'breathing'.

Authorised Outlet, Group of Outlets or other discharge route	Radionuclide or Group of Radionuclides	Annual Limit	Activity discharged (Apr 2021 - Mar 2022)
All authorised outlets taken together.	Tritium	100 MBq	0.3 MBq
	All other radionuclides (excluding tritium)	3 MBq	0.432 MBq
Discharges made as a consequence of reactor breathing	Tritium	3000 MBq	476.98 MBq
	Carbon-14	200 MBq	52.93 MBq

7.2 Non-radiological Environmental update (April 2021 - March 2022)

Treated sewage effluent from the plant is not currently being independently assessed by SEPA due to SEPA Covid restrictions on visiting Site. Results from an independent off-site laboratory analysis verify that the sewage treatment works reed beds continue to work efficiently to maintain good quality effluent in compliance with the sites CAR discharge licence.

Monitoring and trending of data for resources such as water, electricity and fuel continues to determine where use can be minimised, in line with the site Environmental Management System. Over the period April 2021 to March 2022 the site used 15.93 Terra Joules (Tj) of energy; 14.96 Tj attributed to electricity consumption and 0.97 Tj attributed to fuel use in site vehicles, equipment, and generators. In the same 12-month period the site water consumption was 9,540m³. The site continues to report carbon equivalent emissions data as per the new company process.

New reporting requirements have been put in place for waste disposal and recycling with new reporting groups being established for use in the company unified dashboard. Over the period April 2021 to March 2022 a total of 397.85 tonnes of waste was collected for consignment from site (397.05 tonnes for recycling, recovery, or composting, and 0.8 tonnes for disposal to landfill). This gives a recycling rate of approximately 99.80%.

7.3 Environmental Events

There was one significant environmental event reported between December 2021 and March 2022 following the discovery of a defect on one of the sites authorised gaseous discharge stacks during a planned inspection.

The defect was a small hole caused by local corrosion on a thin wall section of the metal duct after the HEPA filter abatement but before the inlet to the stack sampling instrument.

Upon discovery of the defect the associated ventilation plant was switched off and a repair to the stack was carried out.


No other similar defects were identified during the inspection of the remaining site authorised gaseous discharge stacks.

An assessment has concluded that the small hole resulted in an increase to the measured discharge from the stack of 0.3%. This does not alter the monthly discharge information reported to SEPA.

8 SOCIO-ECONOMIC / STAKEHOLDER UPDATE

The electronic application form for the socio-economic scheme can be found on our external website at <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/magnox-working-with-our-communities>

Magnox Socio-economic Scheme 2021/22



Projects supported around Hunterston site

Kilwinning Campus Future Skills Hub update.
North Ayrshire college was awarded £499,999 Magnox funding towards the new skills hub back in 2019. There were significant delays due to Covid and the transfer of the adjacent land from North Ayrshire Council. This is now complete and planning permission was approved by the in July 2021. Ground works are in place and construction has begun. It is anticipated the hub will be ready to welcome students in Spring 2023.



Garnock Visitor and Community Hub – North Ayrshire Council received £500,000 NDA funding towards the £4.2m project. Work is progressing well and on target for completion in August 2022.



Hub taking shape



Artist impression of the new hub

North Ayrshire Council received £23,000 NDA funding to produce a research report assessing the potential impacts that the decommissioning of Hunterston B will have upon North Ayrshire and the wider economy to inform opportunities arising through a coordinated approach to the Hunterston Strategic Development Area.

For further information: [Magnox working with our communities - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/magnox-working-with-our-communities)



9 SITE VISITS AND KEY DATES

Hunterston A Site continues to attract the right kind of interest through our good safety and business performance.

Below is a selection of visitors / key dates during the period.

DATE	EVENT / VISIT
Thursday 3 March	Site Stakeholder Group Meeting (<i>Microsoft Teams Meeting</i>)
Thursday 3 March	Hunterston Decommissioning Teleconference Update by Site Director, Mark Blackley to Hunterston SSG Chair, Rita Holmes and SSG Vice Chair Stuart McGhie. (<i>Microsoft Teams Meeting</i>)
Tuesday 8 March	ONR/CNSS Intervention – John Duffy, Nuclear Security Inspector
Tuesday 8 March	ONR Fire Safety Inspection Ray Kassir/ Steve Hughes
Wednesday 9 March	Dr Ros Rivaz, Chair, Nuclear Decommissioning Authority Mark England, Transfer and Deconstruction Director, EDF Paul Winkle, Chief Operating Office, Magnox
Tuesday 5 April	OBR Inspection – ONR Principal Inspector, Stuart Fannin
Thursday 7 April	John Grierson - Nuclear Operations Director
Wednesday 4 May	Internal Safeguards Review
Monday 9 - Thursday 12 May	SILWE Review – Martin Grey NDA Head of Asset Management & team. Ross McAllister Magnox Programme Delivery Director & team
Tuesday 17 / Wednesday 18 May	Operational Experience Feedback Review - Lead Chris Hinton
Tuesday 17 / Wednesday 18 May	ONR Inspection - ONR Principal Inspector, Stuart Fannin

Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR)

Site Report for Hunterston A

Report for period 1 January – 31 March 2022

Foreword

This report is issued as part of ONR's commitment to make information about inspection and regulatory activities relating to the above site available to the public. Reports are distributed to members for the Hunterston Site Stakeholder Group and are also available on the ONR website (<http://www.onr.org.uk/llc/>).

Site inspectors from ONR usually attend Hunterston Site Stakeholder Group meetings where these reports are presented and will respond to any questions raised there. Any person wishing to inquire about matters covered by this report should contact ONR.

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1 Inspections

Dates of inspection

The ONR site inspector made inspections at the Hunterston A (HNA) site on the following dates during the report period 1 January – 31 March 2022:

- 1-3, 8 March 2022

2 Routine Matters

Inspections

Inspections are undertaken as part of the process for monitoring compliance with:

- the conditions attached by ONR to the nuclear site licence granted under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (NIA65) (as amended);
- the Energy Act 2013
- the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA74); and
- regulations made under HSWA74, for example the Ionising Radiations Regulations 2017 (IRR17) and the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (MHSWR99).

The inspections entail monitoring licensee's actions on the site in relation to incidents, operations, maintenance, projects, modifications, safety case changes and any other matters that may affect safety. The licensee is required to make and implement adequate arrangements under the conditions attached to the licence in order to ensure legal compliance. Inspections seek to judge both the adequacy of these arrangements and their implementation.

In this period, ONR carried out the following planned inspections at HNA:

Licence Condition (LC) compliance inspections: - compliance inspections focus on single LC compliance sampled from areas across the site. Each area may include multiple systems. The LCs inspected during this period were: -

- LC11 Emergency Arrangements
- LC17 Management Systems

ONR also carried out a Fire (Scotland) Act 2005 inspection during the period.

For the LC Inspections and the Fire inspection, ONR judged that the arrangements made and implemented by the site in response to safety requirements were adequate.

During the reporting period, ONR judged the arrangements made and implemented by the site in response to safety requirements to be satisfactory in the areas inspected. Where improvements have been identified, the licensee has made a commitment to

address those issues, and ONR inspectors will closely monitor progress during future site inspections. Where necessary, ONR will take formal regulatory enforcement action to ensure that appropriate remedial measures are implemented to reasonably practicable timescales. Members of the public, who would like further information on ONR's inspection activities during the reporting period, can view site Intervention Reports at www.onr.org.uk/intervention-records on our website www.onr.org.uk. Should you have any queries regarding our inspection activities, please email contact@onr.gov.uk.

Other work

The site inspector held a periodic meeting with safety representatives, to support their function of representing employees and receiving information on matters affecting their health, safety and welfare at work.

3 Non-Routine Matters

Licensees are required to have arrangements to respond to non-routine matters and events. ONR inspectors judge the adequacy of the licensee's response, including actions taken to implement any necessary improvements.

There were no such matters or events of significance during the period.

COVID-19

In response to the Covid-19 pandemic all 12 of Magnox Ltd.'s (ML) licensed sites have put arrangements in place to ensure their workplaces are COVID-secure sites. The sites have returned to a new "normal" with many staff combining working from home and at site as appropriate, with project work restarted to ensure the safe and timely decommissioning of these sites. In this quarter, HNA has continued with a controlled return to service with a number of staff working from home and at site as appropriate and has progressed a significant way through their plans. The ML Internal Oversight team has checked independently that the pandemic and restart arrangements have been properly implemented.

Emergency preparedness is being maintained through a duty cover team at each site in accordance with ONR approved emergency arrangements. These arrangements include the provision to call in additional personnel and the emergency services onto site to assist ML staff. These plans have been regularly rehearsed and observed by ONR inspectors during emergency exercises in the past.

Overall ONR is content with the actions taken by ML to make safe the HNA site under these exceptional circumstances. The site inspector is in touch regularly with HNA personnel to discuss any changes to the arrangements and any potential emerging safety or regulatory issues.

4 Regulatory Activity

ONR may issue formal documents to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. Under nuclear site licence conditions, ONR issues regulatory documents, which either permit an activity or require some form of action to be taken; these are usually collectively termed 'Licence Instruments' (LIs) but can take other forms. In addition, inspectors may take a range of enforcement actions, to include issuing an Enforcement Notice.

- No LIs, Enforcement Notices or Enforcement letters were issued during this period.

5 News from ONR

For the latest news and information from the Office for Nuclear Regulation, please read and subscribe to our regular email newsletter 'ONR News' at www.onr.org.uk/onrnews

6 Contacts

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Published 04/22

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Hunterston Site Stakeholder Group

SEPA Update- Hunterston A

1 June 2022

Chief Executive's Resignation

Following conduct allegations, SEPA's CEO, Terry A'Hearn, has stepped down and left his position. SEPA has a clear Code of Conduct and takes conduct allegations very seriously indeed. To protect anonymity, SEPA is unable to comment further. The recruitment process for a new Chief Executive has commenced and in the interim, Jo Green will continue as Acting Chief Executive, supported by SEPA's Agency Management Team.

Cyber-Attack

On 24 December 2020, we were subject to a serious and complex cyber-attack, displaying significant stealth and malicious sophistication, which significantly impacted our organisation, our staff, our public and private partners, and the communities who rely on our services.

Since the attack, we have worked with Scottish Government, Police Scotland, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and the Scottish Business Resilience Centre (SBRC), to a clear recovery strategy.

We've published [Our response and recovery from a major cyber-attack](#), and a range of voluntary independent audit reports on our response and recovery from Police Scotland, the Scottish Business Resilience Centre and Azets. You can view these reports at sepa.org.uk/cyber-attack.

We will continue to publish the weekly service status until all our services have resumed, continuing to support our organisation, our staff, our public and private partners, and the communities who rely on our services, as we continue our recovery.

Regulation

Environmental Authorisations (Scotland) Regulations 2018 (EASR)- radioactive substances

In addition to the cyber-attack, SEPA has also had to continue to manage the COVID-19 pandemic and its associated restrictions.

Telephone communication with the site continued throughout the period since the last SSG in March, including formal monthly staying in touch telephone calls. Routine teleconferences with Hunterston A and the corporate Magnox Ltd team on strategic issues have also continued as before.

Site visits continue to be planned in order to ensure compliance with the site permit.

An inspection was undertaken just before the last SSG. On 1st March 2022 SEPA carried out an inspection to look at the maintenance schedules of any safety/ environment equipment and how the site ensures that the equipment is fit for use when they have not been used for a prolonged period due to the nature and frequency of potential discharges from the site. This was a joint inspection with ONR. In addition, SEPA had a meeting during the day to discuss BPM documentation relating to a number of projects. There were no permit non compliances found during the inspection.

SEPA Investigation 8th June

SEPA will attend site on 8th June to undertake the initial fact finding stage of an investigation into potential non compliances with the site permit relating to a hole which was discovered in the Solid Active Waste Bunkers Retrieval Facility gaseous discharge stack. (see environmental events section below).

SAWBR Optioneering

In December 2020, Hunterston A wrote to SEPA advising of the Magnox decision to withdraw an extant application to vary the site permit until such a time as the variation could be further underpinned. This allowed further work to be undertaken to support optimisation, characterisation and the treatment of the SAWB waste.

SEPA received an optioneering report from Magnox on 28th March 2022 entitled Review of Options for Managing Waste from The Hunterston A Solid Active Waste Bunkers Given its Status at May 2021 WD/REP/0032/21.

Having initially reviewed the information sent, SEPA considers it needs to undertake a review of the underpinning characterisation work and whether this is sufficient to underpin the optioneering decisions, with particular regard to demonstrating optimisation of the long-term management of the waste and consistency with the Scottish Government's HAW policy for storage and disposal.

SEPA has taken the decision to procure a specialist contractor to review the model and associated work undertaken by Magnox with regards to the characterisation of the SAWB waste.

Other

Magnox provided SEPA with a programme for the coming year for the HNA site with regards to potential variations to the site permit and associated environmental documentation. SEPA has requested an updated version with any date changes.

SEPA has requested that Magnox provide a list of extant/ current BPM documentation for the HNA site.

Non-Rad Regulation

There have been no issues relating to non-rad regulation since the last scheduled SSG meeting.

Environmental Events

The site notified SEPA on 31st March 2022 that contractors carrying out an inspection of the site gaseous discharge stacks on 23rd March 2022 discovered a hole in a gaseous ventilation stack on the site. The hole was after the abatement but before the inlet into the stack sampler. The hole was repaired by the contractors when it was discovered. The site undertook an investigation into the discovery and identified a number of actions. SEPA will undertake an investigation into the potential for non-compliances with the Hunterston A site permit.

There were no other reportable incidents, complaints or non-compliance events affecting SEPA's interests at Hunterston A known to have occurred since the last meeting of the SSG at the time of writing this report.

Radioactivity in Food & the Environment (RIFE)

RIFE is a collaborative report on work carried out by SEPA, the other UK environment agencies, Food Standards Scotland and Food Standards Agency on the radiological monitoring of food and the environment. The RIFE reports aim to provide an in-depth assessment of radioactivity in food and the environment in the UK and the public's exposure to radiation, including in the vicinity of Hunterston B. The RIFE report incorporates the results from the analysis of a wide range of samples and key information on local habits to demonstrate both that food remains safe and that the public's exposure to ionising radiation is within legal limits.

The latest edition (RIFE 26) covering 2020 has been published and can be obtained from SEPA's website along with previous year's reports. RIFE 26 reports that the total dose for the representative person (most exposed) around the Hunterston site, which includes both Hunterston A and Hunterston B, for 2020 was 0.005 millisieverts, which is well below the legal annual dose limit of 1 millisievert as set out in paragraph 26, Schedule 8 of EASR19.

Scottish Pollutant Release Inventory (SPRI)

The Scottish Pollutant Release Inventory (SPRI) is a publicly accessible electronic database of releases of pollutants to all environmental media and transfers of non-radioactive waste. SEPA intends that, as far as practicable, SPRI be the principle means by which information on Scottish pollutant releases and non-radioactive waste transfers is collected and made public. Wherever possible, such information will be collected and presented by this one system. The data for 2019, including that from Hunterston A and B, have been published and are available on SEPA's website under "*Environment/Environmental data/SPRI*".

Melanie Hayes
Radioactive Substances Specialist
11 May 2022

Scottish Government Update to Hunterston Site Stakeholder Group – 1st June 2022

Scottish Government Radioactive Waste and Nuclear Decommissioning Policy Team

BEIS led Policy Review (Command Paper 2919)

We are continuing to engage with BEIS and other organisations on the draft policy framework and process for consultation. This piece of work will refresh the overarching policy framework for radioactive substances and nuclear decommissioning covering the whole of the UK. Therefore the launch of the consultation requires the final agreement of all four UK administrations and could potentially launch in the summer of this year.

The Scottish Government will continue to feed into this work and provide further updates as this develops.

UK Radioactive Substances Common Framework

We have been working with the UK Government and the other devolved administrations on a Common Framework Agreement regarding Radioactive Substances policy. The Framework establishes an agreed approach between the four UK administrations where powers have returned from the EU which intersect with policy areas of devolved competence and is intended to put in place a governance structure and shared ways of working in line with our current and future obligations. This is part of a wider programme of work to develop frameworks across a range of policy areas.

The draft framework was submitted to all four UK Parliaments in December 2021. The Net Zero Committee at the Scottish Parliament has put out a call for evidence on the Radioactive Substances Framework. The call is open until 31 May. The link to the Committee website can be found below for further information;

[Environmental Common Frameworks | Scottish Parliament Website](#)

Scottish Nuclear Sites Stakeholder Group meeting (SSSG)

The date for the next SSSG meeting has been set as the 23rd of August 2022, from 2pm – 4pm. Mairi McAllan MSP, Minister for Environment and Land Reform, has provisionally confirmed her attendance for part of this meeting to speak to the group and hold a short Q&A session. As time is likely to be limited, we would be grateful if any questions for the Q&A could be submitted in writing by close of play on 1st July 2022 to my email address, so that we can plan the session;

Diane.hamilton@gov.scot

Scottish Government
1st June 2022