



HUNTERSTON SITE STAKEHOLDER GROUP

The Sixty Third Meeting of the Hunterston Site Stakeholder Group will take place on
Thursday 3 March 2022 at 1.30pm
By Zoom

AGENDA

13.30 Chairman's Opening Remarks and Declarations of Interest

13.35 Chair and Vice Chair Updates and Correspondence

13.40 Actions and approval of previous Minutes

13.45 Hunterston B Site Reports

Hunterston B Report – Joe Struthers
ONR Report – Stuart Fannin
SEPA Report – Keith Hammond

***Members Question and Answer Session
Public Forum***

14.30 Hunterston A Station Reports

Hunterston A Site Report – Mark Blackley
ONR Report – Bill Kings
SEPA Report – Melanie Hayes

***Members Question and Answer Session
Public Forum***

15.15 NDA Reports

NDA Reports – David Wallace

15.25 Update from Scottish Government

SG Report – Diane Hamilton

***Members Question and Answer Session
Public Forum***

15.35 Presentation on AGR Decommissioning

– Alasdair Walker, AGR Programme Delivery Manager
Decommissioning, Future Missions

***Members Question and Answer Session
Public Forum***

16.00 Any Other Business

Next Meeting Thursday 1 June 2022

**HUNTERSTON SITE STAKEHOLDER GROUP
SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS FROM THE SIXTY SECOND MEETING
HELD ON THURSDAY 2 DECEMBER 2021 ONLINE, ZOOM PLATFORM**

Chair's Opening Remarks and Vice Chair Updates and Correspondence

McGhie summarised the Magnox Site Stakeholder Groups Chairs meeting on 5 November and Mrs Holmes reported on the online NDA Summit entitled 'Keeping the Conversation Going' on 26 November 2021.

Actions and Approval of Previous Minutes

The Minutes of the virtual meeting of 2 September 2021 were approved and an update on actions received.

NDA Report – Mr David Wallace

NDA's Net Zero Report will be issued early 2022. NDA Group supported participation at COP26. Mission Progress Report published on 4 November. Nuclear Waste Services, bringing together LLWR and RWM, launches on 31 January 2022. NDA will take on ownership of seven EDF AGR sites for decommissioning following defueling. Hunterston B is first site. NDA's new Director of Social Impact, Jamie Reed, has just started work. Dr Sam Harris is new Head of Government Affairs. Jonathan Jenkin has been seconded to BEIS for two years. Simon Napper from RWM replaces Mr Jenkin. The NDA Supply Chain Event, postponed from 2020, will be held on 3 February 2022 in Telford International Centre.

Scottish Government Update – Ms Diane Hamilton

Engagement with BEIS continues on development of draft policy framework for Command Paper 2919. Work is taking place on UK Radioactive Substances Common Framework, to create a common framework agreement regarding radioactive substances policy. Scottish Government is working with BEIS, Welsh Government and SEPA to consider options to implement an earlier commitment to allow certain sites to apply to be excluded from the Nuclear Third Party Liability regime. Next Scottish Nuclear Sites Stakeholder meeting will be held virtually on 18 January 2022 at 2.00 pm.

Hunterston B Station Reports

Hunterston B Report – Mr Paul Forrest

The station shut down of Reactor 3 at 12 noon on Friday 27 November, which signifies the last day of generation for R3. R4 will end generation early in January and most efforts are focussed on going through the station's People Plan. Redundancy consultations are complete. The 'Best Fit' process is taking place to match people with their aspirations. Priority is treating people with dignity and respect. Defueling is expected to commence around the end of March 2022, once pre-defueling requirements have been completed.

ONR Report – Mr Stuart Fannin

ONR activity is now focussed on defueling activity and supporting an inspection programme for defueling readiness. Mr Fannin explained the importance of the governance and oversight of the changes to be made to the plant to ensure that the nuclear safety of operating the plant remain paramount. All inspections in the period were graded green overall, with no formal action. Mr Fannin congratulated Team Hunterston B on its very strong performance over the past six months.

SEPA Report – Mr Keith Hammond

Three independent audits have been carried out on the cyber-attack, all with the conclusion that SEPA was not particularly susceptible but was unfortunate. Two inspections have been carried out since the last meeting, with no contraventions. Two events involving asbestos are being investigated. Radioactivity in Food in the Environment (RIFE) Report for 2020 has been published and is available on SEPA's website. The 'total dose' for Hunterston from all pathways and sources of radiation is 0.5% of the annual dose limit and similar to previous years.

Hunterston A Site Reports

Hunterston A Report – Mr Reuben Phillips (on behalf of Mr Mark Blackley)

No nuclear, conventional safety or first aid events. Some very low level contamination was found in Learning and Development Centre, which was below EASR contamination levels. HAW Team has met its SAWBR and WILWREP waste retrieval target of 46 tons retrieved. Target revised to 62 tons. A number of ONR and SEPA inspections have taken place and a Counter Terrorism Exercise to demonstrate out of hours arrangements. Removal of cradle rails at high level on the reactor buildings has been completed. In the SILWE plant, one 3m³ box has been grouted. Radiological Technician Trainees introduced due to difficulties in finding appropriate training partnership for apprenticeships.

ONR Report –

The ONR report was circulated with meeting papers. Mr Kings was not present at the meeting.

SEPA Report – Ms Melanie Hayes

A inspection of SAWBR waste package record took place on 4 October. SEPA had additional questions on a number of areas and will undertake a follow-up inspection. The site had made SEPA aware of an error in a spreadsheet recording the number of radionuclide fingerprints used to calculate radioactivity content of solid waste for Hunterston A, which was being over-reported by less than 0.2%.

There were a number of questions asked by members, the detail of which can be read in the full Minute of the meeting, available from the Secretariat.

Next Meeting – Thursday 3 March 2022 at 1.30 pm. Venue / meeting platform to be confirmed.



**HUNTERSTON SITE STAKEHOLDER GROUP
MINUTES OF SIXTY SECOND MEETING HELD ON
THURSDAY 2 DECEMBER 2021 AT 1.30 PM, ZOOM ONLINE PLATFORM**

Present

Magnox Ltd

Mrs Jill Callander (SSG Secretariat)
Mr Bill Hamilton (Director of Communications)
Mr Sean Marshall (Magnox Communications)
Mr Reuben Phillips (Waste Manager, Hunterston A)

EDF (Hunterston B)

Mr Paul Forrest (Station Director)
Ms Fiona McCall (External Comms Manager)
Mr Stuart McGhie – SSG Vice Chair
Mr Joe Struthers

Community Council Representatives

Mr Ian Dippie (Largs CC)
Mr Graham Wallace (Cumbrae CC)
Mrs Rita Holmes – SSG Chair (Fairlie CC)
Mr John Lamb (West Kilbride CC)

SEPA

Mr Keith Hammond (Hunterston B)
Ms Melanie Hayes (Hunterston A)

North Ayrshire Council (NAC)

ONR

Mr Stuart Fannin (Hunterston B)

NDA

Mr David Wallace (Stakeholder Lead Scotland)

Scottish Government

Ms Diane Hamilton

In Attendance

Ms Sheila Adams (Minutes)
Ms Ruth Corney (Marick Communications)
Ms Helen Smith (Marick Communications)

Mr Peter Roche (Member of Public)
Mr Graham Buckley (Member of Public)

Apologies

Mr Mark Blackley (Site Closure Director, Hunterston A)
Ms Lesley Jeffrey (Ayrshire Civil Contingencies Team)
Mr Bill Kings (ONR, Hunterston A)
Ms Jane McGeorge (Ayrshire Civil Contingencies Team)
Mr Robin Turner (Agriculture Food and Rural Communities Directorate)

Ms Corney, representing Marick Communications, gave a short presentation on housekeeping rules and guidance for getting the best out of the meeting on the Zoom platform and advised that the meeting was being recorded, for minute-taking purposes only.

1. Chairman's Opening Remarks and Declarations of Interest

Mrs Holmes, Chair, welcomed everyone to the sixty second meeting of the Hunterston Site Stakeholder Group online. There were no declarations of interest.
In particular, she welcomed new attendee, Mr Graham Buckley from West Kilbride Community

Council. She noted the apologies from Mr Robin Turner, Agriculture Food and Rural Communities Directorate, who is new to the role and has not yet attended a Site Stakeholder Group.

Mrs Holmes advised of a slight change to the running order of the agenda. Mr Wallace would present the NDA Update, followed by Ms Hamilton giving the Scottish Government update, before both of the site updates, to enable them to leave the meeting to attend other commitments.

2. Chair and Vice Chair Updates and Correspondence

Magnox SSG Chairs and Vice Chairs Meeting – 5 November 2021

NDA Summit Webinar – 26 November 2021

Mr McGhie summarised the Magnox Site Stakeholder Groups Chairs meeting on 5 November. Chairs from the different sites reported on welfare, safety, security and equality. The question of Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) stations moving over to Magnox was asked, as was the shape of Magnox after defueling and Mr McGhie requested confirmation of this. The future of Dounreay was also discussed and the possible change of name for Magnox, on which updates would be appreciated. Mr John Grierson, in his role as Nuclear Operations Director gave site updates and talked about the grouting policy at Hunterston A, which Mr Phillips had covered in his update meeting with the Chair and Vice Chair the previous day. Skills, skills academies and apprenticeships was also discussed and the disappointment in being able to secure apprenticeships, both at Hunterston sites and across Scotland generally, which Scottish Government may be able to provide more information on. There was some discussion on the future Decommissioning Strategy for Hunterston site and the UK Government Nuclear Liabilities Fund and the question of accountability to the tax payer of that budget was asked. Social economic investment in the people and communities around the sites was raised and this will need to be further addressed in the future.

Mrs Holmes reported on the online NDA Summit entitled 'Keeping the Conversation Going'. She was initially disappointed that all questions had to be asked through the chat facility so it was not possible to see questions asked by others during the meeting (although this may have been a technical issue), but she was pleased that her questions were all asked and answered at the meeting and thanked Mr McNamara for facilitating this. There was an update on mission progress and a sharing of ideas and discussion on future direction of the NDA Group. Mrs Holmes commented on the inordinate number of new build items which were only partly relevant and distracted from the main purpose and issues, which were decommissioning and waste.

3. Actions and Approval of Previous Minutes

The Minutes of the Site Stakeholder Group meeting, held on 2 September 2021, virtually on the Zoom platform, were proposed for approval by Mr John Lamb and seconded by Mrs Rita Holmes.

Mrs Callander updated on actions:

- Action – Mr Hammond to check and advise if trade can only be done with UK Stations with regard to the UK Emissions Trading Scheme.

Mr Hammond had kindly provided a response by email which was circulated to members.

- Action – Ms Hamilton to take back Mrs Holmes' request for a presentation at the Scottish Sites meeting on the new Nuclear Support Hub.

Ms Hamilton had some technical difficulties and Mrs Callander read the response from Ms Hamilton:

Ms Hamilton had spoken with Captain Coffey at HMNB Clyde and they will not be able to organise anything for the Scottish Sites Stakeholder Group meeting but he would 'engage with the responsible organisation at HMNB Clyde to understand whether they would be able to support the request.' If this can be facilitated, it will take place at a Hunterston Site Stakeholder Group meeting, not a Scottish Sites Stakeholder meeting.

4. NDA Reports – Mr David Wallace

Mr Wallace thanked the Chair for moving him up the agenda. He thanked Mrs Holmes for her comments on the Summit Webinar, which he will feed back to the NDA. He was also disappointed in the Summit Webinar and was unable to participate due to technical limitations.

NDA employees are largely still working from home, with a mix of home and office working, although with increased Covid numbers and latest guidelines, the preference is to work from home where possible. There has been a progressive return to more face-to-face engagement with small stakeholder groups. The first NDA Sustainability Report was published on 8 March. The NDA will issue its Net Zero Report early in the new year, which will highlight how the NDA intends to meet its net zero targets. The NDA Group supported participation at COP26, involving young people from the Young Generation Network in the process, which went down very well. The Mission Progress Report was published on 4 November. This demonstrates the progress made since 2005 and how much is still to be done over the next 120+ years. The new NDA Business Plan is being drafted. The new waste services decision, Nuclear Waste Services, which will bring together LLWR and RWM, is on target to launch on 31 January 2022, when the new Executive Team will take up their positions. The NDA has been directed by Government to take on ownership of seven EDF Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) sites for decommissioning following defueling. Hunterston B is the first site and will start defueling in January 2022, for which a lot of preparation work is being done. NDA will be involved in transportation and storage of the spent fuel, going from Hunterston B to Sellafield. Nigel Houghton of Magnox Future Missions Team gave a presentation on AGRs at the Summit on 26 November and Mr Wallace welcomed views on this. RWM welcomes the formation of Theddlethorpe Working Group in Lincolnshire which is another Geological Disposal Facility (GDF) Working Group, outwith Cumbria. Mid-Copeland Community Partnership has been formed, which is the next stage from the Working Group and South Copeland in Cumbria is expected to form a Community Partnership early in the new year. The role previously held by Andrew van der Lem has been split into two posts. The NDA's new Director of Social Impact, Jamie Reed, has just started work. He started by fact-finding in Dounreay and will be introduced to Hunterston and Chapelcross sites and Stakeholder Groups in due course. Dr Sam Harris is the new Head of Government Affairs. Jonathan Jenkin has been seconded to BEIS for two years. Simon Napper from RWM replaces Mr Jenkin. The NDA Supply Chain Event, postponed from 2020, will be held on 3 February 2022 in Telford International Centre. A Scottish Supply Chain event was being held that day in Dunblane. In respect of the NDA's 'Keeping the Conversation Going' Summit, Mr Wallace welcomed any further feedback.

Members Question and Answer Session

Mrs Holmes noted the formation of Theddlethorpe Working Group and the intention of South Copeland to form a Community Partnership and asked how many areas in Cumbria are interested in hosting a Geological Disposal Facility (GDF). Mr Wallace confirmed two areas have expressed an interest – Copeland and Allerdale.

Mrs Holmes made Mr Wallace aware of bad press in Private Eye regarding the appointment of Jamie Reed as Director of Social Impact, relating to the use of private emails to avoid having to disclose information when people submit Freedom of Information Requests, particularly in relation to Sellafield, and asked if the NDA had any comment to make on this. Mr Wallace confirmed that he and the NDA are aware of the information in Private Eye but were unable to comment as there is an industrial tribunal regarding this due to take place in January 2022. Mr Reed is also unable to comment until the appropriate time. It is unclear where the information came from and it appears to be gossip, speculation, rumour and innuendo, rather than 'news'. Mrs Holmes disagreed that it was 'rumour' as it appears to centre on emails from Mr Reed to people within and outwith Sellafield, regarding Sellafield, which have been made public and if this is genuine it is a concern. Mrs Holmes noted that Mr Reed is an ex MP in Copeland and was somewhat alarmed at his appointment as Director of Social Impact, as are others in the community. She asked who was responsible for appointing him to this role. Mr Wallace confirmed that NDA went through a recruitment process and the Director of Communication and Stakeholder Engagement, along with HR representatives, would have made the decision. Mr Wallace noted that this was being raised as an issue and will take this back to NDA. This was not mentioned at Dounreay Site Stakeholder Group but Mr Wallace took the concerns on board and will feed back as areas of concern.

Mrs Holmes asked that congratulations are passed on to Mr Jenkin on his secondment, which she saw as a gain for BEIS. Mr Jenkin, is much trusted by Site Stakeholder Groups and has been, along with Mr Hamilton, very supportive of Site Stakeholder Groups with communications.

5. Update from Scottish Government – Ms Diane Hamilton

Ms Hamilton will advise as soon as she hears anything back from Captain Coffey on a presentation. The Scottish Government continues to engage with BEIS on the development of the draft policy framework and the process for consultation with regard to Command Paper 2919. The development process is a significant piece of work and consultation is expected to begin in the new year. Scottish Government will keep the Site Stakeholder Group updated as work progresses. Work is also taking place, with the UK Government and other devolved administrations, on the UK Radioactive Substances Common Framework, to create a common framework agreement regarding radioactive substances policy. Mr Macdonald is working with BEIS, Welsh Government and SEPA to consider options to implement an earlier commitment to allow certain sites to apply to be excluded from the Nuclear Third Party Liability regime. This is not expected to affect nuclear sites in Scotland, but officials will need to consider who the competent authority will be that will make decisions on future applications. This work is expected to be implemented early in 2022. The next Scottish Nuclear Sites Stakeholder meeting will be held virtually on 18 January 2022 at 2.00 pm.

Members Question and Answer Session

Mrs Holmes noted that the Higher Activity Waste Policy review seems to be going on forever and asked if there is an intention to change the title from Higher Activity Waste to Intermediate Level Waste. Ms Hamilton's current understanding is that there will not be a change but she offered to check on this with Mr Macdonald. Mr Lamb added that he raised the fact that there is confusion over the difference between Intermediate Level Waste and Higher Activity Waste in Scotland with Mr Macdonald by email several weeks ago and considered that clarification was required in respect of a general-purpose title in any regulations. Mrs Holmes agreed that there has been confusion from the beginning by calling Intermediate Level Waste, Higher Activity Waste, which gets wearing trying to explain the difference, which could have been avoided by calling it ILW from the start.

On the Radioactive Substances Common Framework, Mr Lamb asked if this would be based on the existing contamination levels differentiation of radioactive substances or if the definition of the levels of the substances would change again. Ms Hamilton was unable to answer the question at the meeting but would take this back to colleagues and report back.

- Action – Ms Hamilton to report back on any changes to existing differentiation of contamination levels in the review of the Radioactive Substances Common Framework.

6. Hunterston B Station Reports

Hunterston B Report – Mr Paul Forrest

Mr Forrest started his report with the current plant status. Notable for the station is the shutdown of Reactor 3 at 12 noon on Friday 27 November, which signifies the last day of generation for Reactor 3. This was marked by a meal for staff in the canteen. Reactor 4 will end generation early in January and most efforts just now are focussed on going through the station's People Plan. Mr Forrest explained the two stages of consultation on redundancy – collective and individual – both of which are now complete. The 'Best Fit' process is now taking place to match people with their aspirations. Priority for the site is treating people with dignity and respect. Hunterston B Station has an outstanding record for safely producing electricity, but it is the people that make it a great plant. Looking to the future, next steps are pre-defueling outages to inspect plant, etc to meet legal requirements. Defueling is expected to commence around the end of March 2022, once pre-defueling requirements have been completed. Continuing to build on and strengthen existing good relationships with NDA and Magnox is a priority to ensure the seamless transfer of the Station from EDF to the Magnox estate.

ONR Report – Mr Stuart Fannin

The ONR report for July – September 2021 issued with the meeting papers was taken as read and had been largely now overtaken by events. Mr Fannin confirmed that Reactor 3 had ceased generation and Reactor 4 will shut down in early January. ONR activity is now focussed on defueling activity. ONR agreement is required for two defueling safety cases – shut down reactor case and fuel handling case. Once ONR has completed its assessments of the safety cases and agreed the safe shutdown of the reactor and configuration for defueling, it will issue a Licence Instrument which will allow the Station to carry on with its defueling programme. Other activity has been largely supporting an inspection programme for defueling readiness. Mr Fannin explained the importance of the governance and oversight of the changes to be made to the plant to ensure that the nuclear safety of operating the plant remain paramount and described the number of inspections which have been carried out during the period. Security inspections have also taken place on configuration management ensuring that systems are adequately isolated, and tanks drained down, etc, reducing hazards to workers. All inspections were graded green overall, with no formal action. Mr Fannin noted that the plant continues to be operated safely and compliantly and for Reactor 3's performance, he congratulated Team Hunterston B on its very strong performance over the past six months. Mrs Holmes echoed this congratulations and was pleased that the workforce was able to commemorate the end of generation of Reactor 3.

SEPA Report – Mr Keith Hammond

The report issued in advance of the meeting was taken as read. Mr Hammond highlighted points to note. In respect of the cyber attack in December 2020, three independent audits have been carried out, one by Police Scotland, all with the conclusion that SEPA was not particularly susceptible and systems were up to Government standard, but was unfortunate. SEPA has taken the bold move to publish as much information as possible to enable others to learn from the experience. With regard to Hunterston B, two inspections have been carried out since the last meeting in September and November, with no contraventions. SEPA officers are back on site more frequently. Two events involving asbestos are being investigated.

The latest Radioactivity in Food in the Environment (RIFE) Report for 2020 has been published and is available on SEPA's website. The 'total dose' for Hunterston from all pathways and sources of radiation is 0.5% of the annual dose limit and similar to previous years.

Members Question and Answer Session

Mr Roche asked Mr Forrest if he knows how long the defueling process is likely to take and if he knows how long the preparation for Care and Maintenance is expected to take. Mr Forrest replied that the defueling is expected to take around three years from commencement in late March 2022. As EDF will not be undertaking the decommissioning and deconstruction, he was unable to answer the second part of the question as this work will be undertaken by Magnox. With regard to the second part of the question, Mr Hamilton added that it is too early to say what will happen to AGRs and there is no longer a blanket Care and Maintenance programme for sites but site-specific strategies, which will be developed. Mr Fannin clarified that, from an ONR perspective, EDF is currently the licensee and the current baseline strategy is Care and Maintenance and applying a safe store is the current decommissioning planning assumption as per the agreement with the Liabilities Fund. ONR is engaging with the Nuclear Liabilities Fund, NDA, Magnox and EDF to work out the forward strategy but at the moment it is a Safe Store Strategy.

Mr Lamb noted that EDF and Magnox have agreed strategic planning assumptions for Hunterston B Intermediate Level Waste and asked about progress on reaching an agreement. Mr Forrest responded that both organisations have an outline agreement that Hunterston B will use Hunterston A's ILW store.

Mr Lamb asked if the detailed plans that B Station had previously for demolition and construction were progressing. Mr Forrest advised that that options are still being reviewed and the Station would not be in a position to submit detailed plans until into the new year but would keep the Site Stakeholder Group updated.

Mr Lamb asked if any progress had been made on offsite transportation of flasks to the loading crane on Peel Port rather than using the A78. Mr Forrest responded that the Station continues to use the A78, which is still the current route.

Mrs Holmes noted that Mr Forrest had intended to walk the route offered by Peel Ports and asked if this is what was referred to as the Flask Corridor. Mr Forrest clarified that the Flask Corridor is an internal corridor within the building. He will be walking the route and meeting with Peel Ports later in December.

Mr Lamb referred to the non-routine matter in the ONR report relating to the receipt of another package which arrived contaminated at Hunterston and was returned to Public Health England. He asked if this was the same as receiving contaminated material. Mr Fannin replied that this was a transport package transported from Public Health England (PHE) at Chilton, Oxfordshire, to Hunterston B in error. This was an error on PHE's part and should not have been sent to Hunterston. Hunterston was not responsible for the package but correctly packaged and returned it to PHE using correct transporting requirements.

Mr Lamb asked about hatches being left open while the Maintenance Team was replacing detection equipment. Mr Forrest clarified that the hatches are fire doors and have been closed.

Mrs Holmes recalled Mr Fannin saying at a previous meeting that the reconfiguration of waste and transportation from Hunterston B to Hunterston A's ILW store would be dependent upon a good safety case being made to ONR and asked if this had been approved. Mr Fannin advised that EDF, Magnox and NLF are still in the process of consulting ONR and SEPA. Discussions have

taken place with EDF and ONR is satisfied that there is sufficient capacity, but further questions have been asked before a decision can be made. Waste from Hunterston B could not be accepted into Hunterston A's ILW store until it had met the waste acceptance criteria which is subject to Magnox's existing safety case for that facility.

Mr Phillips added that he had not been involved in any technical discussions for the safety case for the store yet but was aware that there was sufficient capacity within the vault and certain types of container will be required for the crane to be able to lift them but, as far as he was aware, detailed discussion on acceptance criteria has not taken place yet.

Mrs Holmes asked about Ayrshire College providing training and development and asked who was leading on this. Mr Forrest replied that EDF continues to build a relationship with the College. EDF has the training requirements so would lead on this and the College is the service provider but a more collaborative relationship is the aim. Mr Wallace added that NDA is also involved and has invested £500k with Magnox in Kilwinning Campus. Discussions are taking place on how to support Hunterston A and B's requirements in terms of defueling and decommissioning skills. Mrs Holmes asked if Kilwinning Campus was more likely to provide basic electrical engineering skills rather than defueling because at this point in time, EDF/Hunterston B is the only one with expertise in defueling. She noted that it is some years ago since skills development was discussed with Mr Hamilton when he worked for the NDA. She noted that Mair Jones had advised that the £500k was still sitting in the account. Mr Wallace understands that building is due to start in January, when he will visit the College with Ms Jones. Mr Hamilton confirmed that he was first involved four years ago and emphasised that the delay in providing funding was not because of Magnox or NDA but a series of incidents. The College changed Principals, then the scope, size and design of the project changed which resulted in more questions due to the significant level of funding being provided, governance requirements, etc and then Covid hit. It has taken some time to come to fruition for all of these reasons but will be a fantastic facility for North Ayrshire.

Mrs Holmes asked Mr Forrest how the shutdown works. Mr Forrest advised that all control rods go into the core at the same time and it takes approx. one second to shut the reactor down and around 4.5 seconds for all of the control rods to fully insert. Mrs Holmes asked if this was the same process that happened when there were automatic safety shutdowns. Mr Forrest confirmed that the process is the same, whether manual or automatic. Mrs Holmes further asked how long it was envisaged that the safety case for the defueling would take. Mr Forrest was unable to answer this and would wait until the safety case was approved by ONR before commencing defueling. Mr Fannin echoed Mr Forrest's comments that Reactor 3 was safely shut down. The safety case is to make sure that the control rods are in and cannot come out again. There are some issues with a defueling fault sequence with regard to a fuel plug unit which is subject to further assessment so it is likely to be into the new year before agreement to commence defueling is approved but Mr Fannin reiterated that the reactor was safely shut down. Mrs Holmes asked if it is a straightforward job to secure the fuel plug unit. Mr Fannin explained that it was more of an academic exercise to demonstrate that the fuel plug unit will be safely returned to the reactor and will not fall into the reactor during defueling. He assured members that ONR is as keen as everyone for the process of getting fuel out of the reactors to start.

Mrs Holmes referred to Licence Condition 22 and the modifications required and imagined this would be a complex job. Mr Fannin advised that modifications are required for the plant to be put into its defueling configuration. This refers to things like isolating control rods, draining down the pressure vessel cooling water system, certain protections on retrieval machine, enhancements to controls on interlocks on flask handling cranes, etc. These things will happen during the first quarter of 2022.

7. Hunterston A Site Reports

Hunterston A Reports – Mr Reuben Phillips

The Hunterston A Site Report for the period distributed with the meeting papers was taken as read. Mr Phillips highlighted key points on behalf of Mr Blackley, who was on leave. Hunterston A site is still waiting for its Site-Specific Strategy and how it changes from the Care and Maintenance date in the existing plan. Covid numbers on site remain low and some precautions have been relaxed, such as the one-way system and on-site testing, due to people being able to test at home, but this can be reinstated if required in future. There have been no nuclear or conventional safety events. Some very low level contamination was found in the Learning and Development Centre on the south side of the site. This was below the contamination levels of the Environment Authorisation Scotland Regulations so not technically regarded as radioactive material. This has however been isolated to allow the building to be taken down. The Higher Activity Waste Team has met its targets of bringing waste down to Solid Active Waste Bunker Retrieval (SAWBR) and Wet Intermediate Level Waste Retrieval and Encapsulation Plant (WILWREP) with 46 tons of waste retrieved. The target has now been revised to 62 tons. There have been a number of ONR and SEPA inspections during the period and a Counter Terrorism Exercise to demonstrate out of hours arrangements. Under recruitment, a number of vacancies have been filled but there is still a large number to fill. Off-shift transition arrangements are still going well. There have been no first aid events. Under the Plant and Structures Programme, the removal of cradle rails at high level on the reactor buildings has been completed. Painting of exposed steelwork from the removal of the rails is being completed. WILWREP has been reconfigured for acid recovery encapsulation. A remotely operated dumper truck will go into the tanks shortly to retrieve the last small amount of sludge in tanks. In terms of the Solid Intermediate Level Waste Encapsulation (SILWE) plant, one 3m³ box has been grouted. This is non radioactive waste and a full sized box to test the grouting system, which is a big milestone for the facility. The six-month review of the four-day working week has concluded and permission from the Executive to approve this as a more permanent arrangement is awaited. Radiological Technician Apprenticeships are now being called Radiological Technician Trainees due to the difficulties in finding an appropriate training partnership for apprenticeships. Since the last meeting, David Peattie, CEO of NDA, Gwen Parry-Jones, CEO of Magnox, and Lawrie Haynes, Chair of Magnox, have visited the site. The site also hosted a meeting of SEPA, NDA, Magnox, Scottish Government and Dounreay.

Members Question and Answer Session

Mr Lamb asked how easy it would be to grout the boxes with radioactive waste with the waste having settled over a number of years and asked if the grout penetrated the box or just capped the box. Mr Phillips explained that the settling of the waste should not be a problem as the grout penetrates the whole of the box, with the appropriate density and fluidity that it gets into all the spaces and a mesh at the top of the box stops any material floating up so the whole of the box is grouted, with a clean layer of capping grout on top.

In terms of SAWBR, Mr Lamb asked how much is still in Bunker 1. Mr Phillips replied that it is difficult to put an exact figure on this, but it is significantly less than 50%. More challenges are expected as it gets further down.

Mr Lamb referred to the items found in Sludge Tank 3 of WILWREP and asked if items were found in Tanks 1 and 2. Mr Phillips confirmed that this was the case and debris was expected. Tank three is furthest progressed so is the emptiest and tank one still has the most sludge in it.

In respect of the Ponds Programme and delay tank valve chamber foam filling, Mr Lamb assumed

this would deteriorate over time and asked if there was any guarantee on how long the filling would last. Mr Phillips responded that this is not a permanent solution, but a holding position to minimise the water that would come into that pit, and the foam will come out a later date. That is why it is foam rather than cement.

Mr Roche referred to the report talking about the current work programme lasting till 2030 but in the previous strategy it seemed to be to 2022 so he wondered what works are being carried out between 2022 – 2030. He asked if this would be work previously classified as reactor dismantling. Mr Phillips explained that the site had been communicating 2030 for some time and the scope is the same but some jobs such as SAWBR and WILWREP are taking longer. The Care and Maintenance entry date is October 2030.

Mrs Holmes referred to the two local Radiological Technician Trainees being taken on and asked if this is because they cannot be called apprentices as they are not on an apprenticeship programme. Mr Phillips confirmed that two Production Technicians had been taken on for the SILWE plant who will operate the kit. The Radiological Technician Trainees are being trained through a Magnox internal process as it has not been possible to find appropriate partnerships to deliver traditional apprenticeships. Mrs Holmes asked if the two Production Technicians were showing other people how to use the plant or if they were learning themselves and if they are learning themselves, who is instructing them on how it is to be used. Mr Phillips advised that they are being employed on the grouting part of the SILWE project, which is a Magnox subset of the SILWE plant. A team of engineers was working on this plant but were doing some of the operations activities, which is not the best use of their time, and because it will go on for some time, operatives were brought in who will be trained by the Magnox engineers on commissioning activity and will then dovetail with waste operations. They will be kept on through the operations and into the commissioning phase. Mr Hamilton added that the difficulties with apprenticeships is not specific to Hunterston and has also been raised at Chapelcross and it appears to be easier in England and Wales to reach out to local Colleges and have the infrastructure to create apprenticeships. This appears to be a problem in Scotland and is being recognised and addressed as a live issue by senior personnel in NDA and Magnox. Mrs Holmes thanked Mr Phillips for finding a way to fill this gap and hoped that work could be done by NDA and Magnox soon to progress the training issues. She will also take this up with Scottish Government at the next Scottish Sites meeting in January 2022.

Mrs Holmes noted that active commissioning is scheduled to commence in the fourth quarter of 2023 by which time all the boxes will be in the Hunterston ILW store and may then have to come out of the ILW store to be grouted, if this happens. Mrs Holmes noted that it is the preference of the Site Stakeholder Group that this happens, not least because of the £50m cost of an encapsulation plant. Mrs Holmes sympathised with those working in waste and decommissioning as it is a very time consuming and complex process which has to be done safely. She asked if anyone representing Magnox or NDA knew if the waste already in the ILW store was going to be encapsulated or not. From a site perspective, Mr Phillips advised that the site is working through justification with SEPA and is working through a series of documents arguing for the use of the encapsulation plant when it comes to that stage. Boxes will still be being produced in 2023 which will require encapsulation but will not come from SAWBR as this will be finished. It will be a long process to bring the boxes in the ILW store out to grout them and Mr Phillips explained the process and steps in the journey of hazard reduction. Mrs Holmes would be interested to learn more about the positives and negatives of grouting and not grouting. Mr Wallace advised that NDA is in discussion with Scottish Government through James McKinney, Chief Strategist, and will speak to him and perhaps invite him to the next meeting to talk through some of the issues and challenges.

Mrs Holmes asked about the robustness and reliability of the machinery that transfers within the ILW store and how easy it is to maintain. For example, the crane that puts the boxes in place in

the store will be used for more boxes than originally planned.

Mr Phillips confirmed that the whole building has a 100-year design life. The facility has been designed and constructed so that maintenance can be done as safely as possible in low hazard areas and packages will not be moved around much.

Ms McCall left the meeting at 2.55 pm.

ONR Report

The ONR report was circulated with the meeting papers. Mr Kings was not present at the meeting.

SEPA Report – Ms Melanie Hayes

SEPA's report on Hunterston A was circulated with the meeting papers. Ms Hayes focussed on points not already covered by Mr Hammond. She reported that SEPA staff are still working full-time from home and this was not expected to change before April 2022. There had been a few site visits since the last meeting. Ms Hayes explained an inspection of the SAWBR waste package records which took place on 4 October. SEPA had additional questions on a number of areas and will undertake a follow-up inspection on 14 December. Ms Hayes apologised for there being half a sentence in the Events section of the written report. The site had made SEPA aware of an error in a spreadsheet recording the number of radionuclide fingerprints used to calculate radioactivity content of solid waste for Hunterston A, which was being over-reported by less than 0.2%. Further meetings and discussions with the site have confirmed that the figures have been corrected. SEPA had been made aware of the two fuel finds. The process for considering options for any fuel recovered from the bunker remains an ongoing process by Magnox who continues to engage with key stakeholders. There were no reportable incidents or events on site.

Members Questions and Answer Session

Mrs Holmes asked if there was anything else to know about spent fuel rods at Hunterston A. Ms Hayes advised that SEPA is awaiting further documentation from the site to ensure that the waste has been appropriately characterised before it would be grouted.

Mrs Holmes referred to the over-reporting of radionuclide fingerprints by less than 0.2% and asked of what significance this was. Ms Hayes confirmed that this was not significant and was down to a decimal place error in the spreadsheet. The site had discovered the error and made SEPA aware of it. SEPA's only concern was making sure that the site updated and corrected the error, which had been done. SEPA's Registry is not yet back online following the cyber-attack. Mrs Holmes asked if the over-reporting meant that the site had reported that more waste had been disposed of than was actually the case. Ms Hayes clarified that the over-reporting referred to activity, not volume, so there was less activity.

8. Any Other Business

Mrs Holmes was concerned to note that there were no North Ayrshire Councillors present at the meeting and only one at the last meeting. She was particularly concerned that not only were they not present, but no apologies had been received. She noted that there may be a change in elected members following the elections in May 2022 and this may change the representation of North Ayrshire Council on the Site Stakeholder Group.

Action – Mrs Callander to email to establish if there have been any changes in representation as there has been no attendance or apologies from North Ayrshire Councillors.



Mrs Holmes noted that Skelmorlie Community Council had requested membership and been admitted to the Site Stakeholder Group but had not attended a meeting since being admitted.

Action – Mrs Callander to email Skelmorlie Community Council to check their position.

Mrs Holmes noted that the representative of National Farmers Union Scotland had not been present at the last few meetings.

Action – Mrs Callander to email National Farmers Union Scotland to check their position.

Mr Graeme Wallace advised that elections to Cumbrae Community Council which should have taken place in October 2020 were postponed to 2021 due to Covid. Initially there was only one nomination. There had now been five, which was enough to establish the Community Council. Mr Graeme Wallace was no longer on the Community Council and did not know at this stage who the representative would be. He asked if the representative on the Site Stakeholder Group has to be someone from the Community Council or if someone can be co-opted on. Mrs Holmes thought that the member had to be a Community Council member and asked Mr Dippie if this was the case when he represented Largs Community Council at a meeting. Mr Dippie confirmed that he had only attended one Site Stakeholder Group meeting previously, in spring 2021, when he was a Community Council member. Mr Graeme Wallace undertook to advise on the position after Cumbrae Community Council had had its first meeting. Mr Marshall clarified that the current Constitution allows for five representatives from North Ayrshire Council, which currently represents ward areas. He noted the boundary change which will make the wards larger and noted that it is for North Ayrshire Council to select their members. There is also scope however to review and make amendments to the Constitution, if required. Mrs Holmes noted that focussing on the north coast would exclude Kilwinning, which is currently represented and has socio economic activity through the College. She thought that Councillors volunteer to sit on the Site Stakeholder Group, which is voted on by elected members, rather than being appointed by North Ayrshire Council. She suggested that it would be appropriate for NDA to discuss membership of the Site Stakeholder Group with North Ayrshire Council.

Action – Mr David Wallace will contact the Chief Executive of North Ayrshire Council to establish the position on membership of the Site Stakeholder Group.

9. Next Meeting – Thursday 3 March 2022

The date of the next meeting is scheduled for **Thursday 3 March 2022**.

Mrs Holmes thanked everyone for attending the online meeting and hoped to see everyone at the next meeting. She wished everyone the compliments of the season and brought the meeting to a close at 3.14 pm.



Site Stakeholder Group

Hunterston B Station Director's Report

Period: November 2021 to January 2022

1. End of generation

At midday, on Friday 26th November 2021, Reactor 3 was taken offline for the final time, followed by Reactor 4 on Friday 7th January 2022. This marked the end of almost 46 years of safe and reliable zero carbon generation from the site.

On both occasions, staff had the opportunity to watch the reactors coming offline and enjoyed a Covid safe indoor BBQ and cake.

Station Director, Paul Forrest, and Plant Manager, Joe Struthers, thanked everyone at the station, past and present, for all their hard work, dedication and pride in helping to make the generation phase of Hunterston B a great success. The celebrations were about respecting the past and embracing the future.



Since the station came online in 1976 it has produced enough zero-carbon electricity to power every home in Scotland for nearly 31 years. The carbon avoided by the station, when compared to gas generation, is like taking every car off Scotland's roads for 19 years.

It was originally thought Hunterston B would run for 25 years but investment in the plant and the people who work here mean that was safely extended to 46 years.

Under the terms of a contract agreed with UK Government in June 2021, EDF will carry out defueling at all seven of the UK's Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) stations before the sites are transferred to the NDA for its subsidiary Magnox to continue with decommissioning.

2. Defueling and decommissioning

During the reporting period, the Reactor 3 pre-defueling outage continued to be delivered in line with station plans. Two plant modifications are being carried out which are required to enable defueling, these are the permanent isolation of control rods and the isolation and drain down of the pressure vessel cooling water system.

The Fuel Handling and Reactor Defueling safety cases are being reviewed by the ONR. EDF is proactively engaging with ONR to provide responses to their feedback and delivery of the Licence Instrument is expected in time for the start of defueling.

A programme of improvement works have been taking place in the Flask Corridor to support increased traffic during the defueling period. This is an area within the station through which the flasks are processed as they make their way off site. The works are progressing to plan and commissioning and testing is scheduled to take place soon. The delivery of these improvements will support of both Reactor 3 and Reactor 4 in a safe, reliable and efficient manner.

3. Safety and Environment

Pandemic Response arrangements in response to COVID-19

EDF's sites have a five-stage tiered approach which is based on the Covid-19 infection rate on site and in the surrounding local area, with 1 being the lowest risk and 5 the highest. Each of the risk levels has a suite of actions in place to help protect the site.

The risk status of our site is monitored daily by the Outbreak Management Team (OMT), which includes our company doctors.

On Monday 31 January, following consultation with the Fleet Incident Management Team, Hunterston B moved from Risk Rating 3 to Risk Rating 2.

A number of enhanced control measures remain on site including:

- An appropriate face covering must be worn in all internal areas, with the exception of:
 - Those exempt for medical reasons
 - When at your work site where social distancing can be maintained
 - When seated at a table to eat or drink
- Criteria for close contact self-isolation aligns with the Government's self-isolation criteria. Triple-vaccinated workers can return to our Generation sites but must carry out a lateral flow tests before travelling to site for 7 days.
- The requirement for 2 metre social distancing.

The station is continuously reviewing these arrangements in the event escalation to Risk Rating 3 is required.

Station Industrial Safety Performance

Safety performance during the reporting period has been good and our Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR) sits at 0.

We have continued to improve and develop our Industrial Safety Action Team meetings alongside our contract partners and union reps. We have asked them to share ideas to promote a safe working partnership at Hunterston B and have seen an increased dialogue that supports our shared safety objectives.

We are closely monitoring our staff and contract partners during this busy pre-defueling period with daily walkdowns across work sites. Our aim is to support and promote a healthy questioning attitude to help people understand and manage risks at the point of work. Our observations have allowed timely interventions resulting in targeted focus areas in working at height, use of portable electrical equipment and areas within the Construction Design and Management (CDM) Regulations 2015.

We have completed a program of work on a number of our buildings to repair and mitigate against foul weather and storms and continue to proactively manage and plan building fabric works across the Station. As we embark on defueling we have begun a campaign of upgrades and maintenance within the Fuel Route and commenced projects relating to eventual decommissioning. All have safety and quality at the heart of planning and execution, with industrial safety embedded with the groups. In Q4 of 2021 we completed compliance evaluations for non-nuclear processes, scaffold and COMAH with no significant gaps.

Looking ahead, we will be carrying out evaluations on key CDM related activities including confined space arrangements; pressure systems; vessels and pipework; drilling and cutting and management of contractors. We will also be utilising Time in the Field with leaders and coaches to support and foster our nuclear, industrial and fire safety behaviours.

Radiological Protection

The radiation dose of each worker is assessed individually by an electronic personal dose meter. A computer database keeps records for each worker. Exposure is continuously monitored and ultimately compared with the levels specified in the Ionising Radiations Regulations (2017) which are the UK Health and Safety legislation that applies to work with radiation.

During the reporting period the Collective Radiation Exposure (CRE) was below plan (see table below). Collective doses are pre-planned for each year based on scheduled maintenance, outages and routine operations. A breakdown of dose received is shown below (along with a comparison of relevant dose statistics).

All work is fully reviewed and justified in order to ensure all doses received were ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable). This involves justifying and optimising the dose, as well as remaining within those dose limits.

Differences between the actual and planned dose can be down to a range of factors including changes to the work programme, development of new techniques for carrying out work that will result in a lower dose and the deployment of new equipment. In this case, the reduced work programme resulted in the actual dose being lower than the predicted.

There were no reportable radiological protection events during this reporting period.

Radiation Dose to workers (November 2021 - January 2022)		
Planned collective dose	10.5man.mSv	
Actual collective dose	7.1man.mSv	
	Employee	Contract Partner
Total Dose	4.55man.mSv	2.47man.mSv
Average individual dose	0.01mSv	0.01mSv
Highest individual dose	0.32mSv	0.43mSv
Individuals	366	345

Chest X-ray	Transatlantic Flight	CT scan	Average UK annual dose to public	EDF Energy Dose Restriction Level	UK legal dose limit for radiation workers
0.014mSv	0.08mSv	2.0mSv	2.6mSv	10mSv	20mSv

Explanatory notes:

- mSv: milliSieverts (SI unit of dose received by an individual)
- man.mSv: The collective dose for a group of workers (i.e. the total of the doses received by each member of a group).

Environmental Safety

There have been no significant environmental events in the period November 2021 to January 2022.

As previously reported, an oil filled electrical cable from Transformer 4 lost pressure and some oil escaped into a bunded trench. The oil was a mixture of partially and fully biodegradable oil. A designed drain route transferred leaked oil from the trench to an oil interceptor. There was no loss of oil to ground and the leak site has been repaired.

Radioactive gaseous and aqueous discharges arising from normal plant operations remain at levels well below those authorised by SEPA.

The programme of off-site environmental monitoring and radiation surveys in the district has continued throughout the period and demonstrates that the radiological discharges from the station have a negligible impact on the local environment. Reports are provided monthly and quarterly to SEPA, detailing the samples and results of analysis performed.

Work to process and package solid low level wastes has continued in the period as part of normal operations and consignments have been made to our regular partners.

Emergency Arrangements

There have been no issues with the emergency arrangements during this reporting period. Hunterston B continues to work closely with Fleet as we move from generation to defueling arrangements. As a group, we have been working on scenarios and fault events that will exercise our Emergency Arrangements.

During the first two months of 2022 we will be demonstrating our arrangements with oversight from the Office of Nuclear Regulation on areas of site security and fault scenarios. In addition, we will be exercising with our staff to maintain knowledge and experience.

One exercise from the 2021 shift exercise programme has been rescheduled for February 2022. E shift was unable to complete its programmed exercise due to a change in the site COVID risk rating.

Preparations for the removal of plant that affects emergency arrangements are being supported through Engineering Changes. This includes specialist assessment against the current emergency plan. With the reduction of chemicals and substances that are no longer needed for a defueling site, comes a reduction in risk and therefore changes to some aspects of response within our emergency arrangements.

Fleet Emergency Preparedness staff are liaising with external stakeholders on changes to the emergency arrangements based upon Hunterston B's move into defueling. This includes reviewing hazard evaluations conducted under the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations.

4. Generation

During the November to January reporting period, Reactor 3/Turbine Generator 7 operated continuously before being taken off-line on 26 November 2021 for its scheduled end of generation date.

Reactor 4/Turbine Generator 8 operated continuously with one three-day reduction in power for refuelling before being taken off-line on 7 January 2022 for its scheduled end of generation date.

Both units have moved to defueling status and shall not return to generation.

5. People

Following the completion of the Collective Consultation and “Best Fit” process, an independent review took place in November. This was attended by the National Joint Council Chair and Secretary as well as an independent senior representative within Generation and the Employee Relations Manager and was carried out to ensure the agreed processes and principles had been followed. They found the information presented to be exemplary and the process had been carried out with the common goal of meeting the aspirations of employees.

The outcome letters for ‘Best Fit’ were sent out and line managers talked to each employee to explain individual outcomes. Communications were also sent to employees following the conclusion of the independent review which shared;

- 100% of employees whose aspiration was to remain at Hunterston B were able to do so, either in their own role or a suitable alternative role.
- 97% of employees overall had aspirations met, either to remain in employment or for redundancy
- We could not meet the aspiration of 3% of employees whose first preference was redundancy.

The station is pleased to have been able to meet as many employee aspirations as possible.

Some Management Team changes come into place at the end of January. Paul Forrest has accepted the role of Station Director at Torness and has been replaced by Joe Struthers who was previously Plant Manager.

Daniel Smith moves from Operations Manager to acting Plant Manager and Alistair Rafferty becomes acting Operations Manager.

Recruitment is ongoing to permanently fill these positions.

6. Company Update

Lewis Wind Power's Stornoway Wind Farm receives additional consent

Lewis Wind Power Project Manager Claire Jones said, "We are pleased Scottish Ministers have approved the additional consent for the Stornoway Wind Farm under Section 36 of the Electricity Act 1989.

This comes after two rounds of community consultation on the company's proposals, with public exhibitions at Stornoway Town Hall in October 2018 and February 2019. During these consultations we listened carefully to feedback from local people and consequently made changes to our proposal.

The new consent will give Lewis Wind Power the option of using the very latest onshore wind turbines on the market, which we believe may be necessary to generate power at the cost required to compete for long-term contracts in a government-backed auction taking place this year."

Contracts are awarded by the Low Carbon Contracts Company (LCCC) on a competitive basis with onshore wind farms on Scotland's 'remote islands' competing with other less established technologies including floating offshore wind, geothermal and wave power.

This new consented design features up to 24 turbines with a tip height of up to 180m and 9 turbines with a tip height of up to 156m, a total of up to 33 wind turbines. This compares to a maximum of 36 turbines at up to 145m in the project's earlier consent (from 2012, which was then amended in 2015). The latest consent also increases the separation distance between a number of turbines in the eastern part of the site and the town of Stornoway.

The Environmental Assessment completed to support the application detailed a number of mitigation measures which were embedded in the design of the scheme and controlled through the conditions attached to the consent. Lewis Wind Power look forward to working with stakeholders such as CnES, SEPA and NatureScot to deliver the project.

Claire Jones added "I would like to thank the Stornoway Trust for their support in the development of this project over the last twenty years and the Comhairle nan Eilean Siar for their constructive approach to the planning aspects of this development. The team at Lewis Wind Power will now focus efforts on supporting SSE to build a new electrical link to the island, obtain the other consents needed and further develop the routes to market."

Secretary of State praises progress at Hinkley Point C

The Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy has been in Somerset seeing how work is progressing at Hinkley Point C.

Kwasi Kwarteng MP toured Europe's largest construction site with the Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury, Helen Whately MP. The Chairman and Chief Executive of EDF, Jean-Bernard Levy, accompanied the Ministers as they were shown around by the team building the UK's first new nuclear power station in a generation.



The visit follows government commitments to new nuclear set out in the Energy White Paper, and passage through the House of Commons this week of the Nuclear Financing Bill, which will help lower the costs of building new nuclear such as Sizewell C. The Government has committed to putting nuclear at the heart of the UK's future energy mix, along with wind and solar. Hinkley Point C will be crucial in helping the country hit net-zero carbon emissions

by 2050 – by moving the UK away from high-polluting fossil fuels.

The Ministers were shown how construction has maintained momentum, despite the challenges caused by the pandemic. Experience gained from building the first reactor unit has allowed teams to deliver the second more efficiently, such as the liner ring being built 25% quicker than the same part for unit 1.

Apprentices also met the Ministers and shared their experiences of gaining industry experience at Hinkley Point C. More than 850 have been trained so far, strengthening the UK's skilled workforce. The project is expected to reach its goal of creating 1,000 apprenticeships later this year.

Business and Energy Secretary Kwasi Kwarteng said: "The UK Government recognises that large-scale nuclear is the only technology available to provide continuous, low carbon electricity at scale. In order to strengthen Britain's energy security and reduce our exposure to volatile global gas prices, we are firmly committed to deploying new nuclear, as seen through the construction of Hinkley Point C.

"To build on Hinkley Point C's success, we're backing the next generation of projects through our landmark Nuclear Bill. With a new funding model on the statute books, we will be able to attract British funds and other institutional investors to lower the cost of financing new nuclear power and, importantly, help to lower electricity bills for consumers and businesses.

"It has been remarkable to see how construction work is progressing and to meet with some of the workers driving forward one of Britain's biggest infrastructure projects. New nuclear is not only at the heart of our plans to ensure greater energy independence, but to create high-quality jobs, boost apprenticeships and drive economic growth."

Managing Director of Hinkley Point C Stuart Crooks said: "Hinkley Point C will be crucial in the fight against climate change, protecting the UK's energy security and insulating British homes and businesses from volatile global gas prices. We are also changing lives for the better, training apprentices, creating jobs, and pumping billions into the economy."

Chief Executive of EDF UK Simone Rossi said: "The building of a near-identical power station in Suffolk, Sizewell C, means the UK can continue this powerful legacy. Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C will be twin projects, but the ownership will be different: EDF is a majority investor in Hinkley Point C, but Sizewell C will be majority owned by British investors. Legislation to finance the project making progress through the House of Commons this week was an important step in securing the future of the UK nuclear industry and the country's low carbon energy supplies."

For more information about anything in this report or other station issues, contact:

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Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR)

Site Report for Hunterston B

Report for period 1 October to 31 December 2021

Foreword

This report is issued as part of ONR's commitment to make information about inspection and regulatory activities relating to the above site available to the public. Reports are distributed to members for the Hunterston B Site Stakeholder Group (SSG) and are also available on the ONR website (<http://www.onr.org.uk/llc/>).

Site inspectors from ONR usually attend Hunterston SSG meetings where these reports are presented and will respond to any questions raised there. Any person wishing to inquire about matters covered by this report should contact ONR.

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1. Inspections

1.1 Dates of inspection

The ONR site inspector, supported by specialist inspectors, made inspections on the following dates during the report period 1 October to 31 December 2021:

- 19 - 21 October 2021
- 16 - 18 November 2021
- 14 - 16 December 2021

ONR's civil nuclear security inspector usually undertakes quarterly inspections at Hunterston B:

- The site security inspector carried out an inspection on the 7 December 2021.

2. Routine Matters

2.1. Inspections

Inspections are undertaken as part of the process for monitoring compliance with:

- the conditions attached by ONR to the nuclear site licence granted under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (NIA65) (as amended);
- the Energy Act 2013;
- the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA74); and
- regulations made under HSWA74, for example the Ionising Radiations Regulations 2017 (IRR17), the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (MHSWR99), the Radiation Emergency Preparedness and Public Information Regulations 2019 (REPPPIR) and The Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations 2009 (CDG);
- The Fire (Scotland) Act 2005;
- The Nuclear Industries Security Regulations (NISR) 2003;
- The Nuclear Safeguards (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (NSR19).

The inspections entail monitoring the licensee's actions on the site in relation to incidents, operations, maintenance, projects, modifications, safety case changes and any other matters that may affect safety. The licensee is required to make and implement adequate arrangements under the conditions attached to the licence in order to ensure legal compliance. Inspections seek to judge both the adequacy of these arrangements and their implementation.

In this period, routine inspections of station covered the following:

- Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 2015 (COMAH).
- NISR2003 – Nuclear Security.
- LC7 – Incidents on site.

During the reporting period, ONR judged the arrangements made and implemented by the site in response to safety requirements to be satisfactory in the areas inspected. Where improvements have been identified, the licensee has made a commitment to address those issues, and ONR inspectors will closely monitor progress during future site inspections. Where necessary, ONR will take formal regulatory enforcement action to ensure that appropriate remedial measures are implemented to reasonably practicable timescales.

Members of the public, who would like further information on ONR's inspection activities during the reporting period, can view site Intervention Reports at www.onr.org.uk/intervention-records on our website www.onr.org.uk. Should you have any queries regarding our inspection activities, please email contact@onr.gov.uk.

COMAH – On the 21 October specialist conventional health and safety inspectors carried out an inspection against the COMAH requirements to control the hazardous substance inventory on site and to review the arrangements to reduce the inventories during defueling. The inspection confirmed a structured approach, using the engineering change modification process, will be used to remove specific hazardous substances and associated major accident hazards at the earliest opportunity during defuelling. Hazardous substance storage and off-loading facilities were also inspected and a good standard was observed, but with some minor areas for improvement. An inspection rating of Green, no formal action was therefore assigned to the inspection.

NISR2003 – On the 7 December the security inspector carried out an observation of a Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC) Response Model Training exercise. The inspector observed a number of exercise scenarios and provided feedback on the areas of strength as well some opportunities for improvement. The observation was not formally rated.

LC 7 – On the 16 December the nominated site inspector, with support from the conventional health and safety inspector, carried out an inspection of incidents on the site. The Operational Experience (OE) Investigation process was examined to determine whether the direct and root causes of events had been applied, that corrective actions deemed necessary to prevent recurrence were being identified and that the lessons for similar plant or operations had been identified. The inspection confirmed that station is following its OE Investigation process adequately. There are some opportunities to increase the learning extracted from the investigation of events, which have potential to inform the plant configuration control programme during the defuelling phase. A rating of Green, no formal action, was therefore assigned to the inspection.

In addition to our routine compliance inspections, ONR inspectors also inspect operating reactors against safety-related systems. Each site has a safety case that demonstrates

how it operates safely. For advanced gas cooled reactors, each of approximately fifteen key systems are inspected against the claims made upon them by the safety case. The aim is to systematically inspect all the significant safety related systems within a five-year cycle (three per year). ONR believes that this will provide more robust assurance of the site's safe operation and how the safety case is being implemented.

- There were no system-based inspections during the reporting period.

ONR also carries out themed inspections which seek to evaluate the effectiveness and consistency of implementation of the licensee's processes and procedures. These inspections are carried out at the site, across the EDF fleet and, in some cases across other licensees.

- There were no theme inspections during the reporting period.

2.2 Other work

The site inspector held periodic meetings with safety representatives and the EDF internal regulation team, to support their functions of representing employees and receiving information on matters affecting their health, safety and welfare at work and to provide internal challenge on nuclear safety matters.

3. Non-Routine Matters

Licensees are required to have arrangements to respond to non-routine matters and events. ONR inspectors judge the adequacy of the licensee's response, including actions taken to implement any necessary improvements.

Licence Condition (LC) 7 requires licensees to make and implement adequate arrangements for the notification, recording, investigation and reporting of incidents occurring on the site. During this period, the site inspector reviewed incidents that met the criteria for routine reporting to ONR. The site and specialist inspectors also sampled the station's follow up reports and corrective actions. From the evidence sampled, the inspector was satisfied that the events reported during the period, had been adequately investigated and appropriate event recovery actions identified.

Matters and events of particular note during the period were:

- On 9 November a maintenance technician received a minor hand injury during the operation of a pressure testing vessel used for fuel plug units. This was a conventional health and safety matter and there was no risk to members of the public. ONR reviewed the site investigation and noted that inadequate staff training and the absence of a detailed safe system of work were identified as principal causes. ONR noted some further learning could have been identified from this event through use of HSE publication 'Safety requirements for pressure testing', including the

importance of adequate supervision to ensure staff follow the Safe System of Work.

- On 20 December 2021 a discrepancy with flux detector accountancy records was reported. Flux detectors are used to measure the neutron flux within the reactors. They are categorised under the Nuclear Safeguards Regulations as Non-Fuel Fissile Material (NFFM) as the detectors contain a very small quantity of enriched uranium. The number of flux detectors held on site and their NFFM weights recorded on the nuclear material accountancy system did not align. An investigation is ongoing and the safeguards inspector will follow this up when the investigation report becomes available.

End of generation at Hunterston B.

- On 26 November 2021 Reactor 3 ceased operating after its final period of safe and compliant operation. The reactor was safely shutdown with all necessary post trip cooling established and it is now undergoing its pre-defuelling outage. ONR is currently assessing the reactor shutdown and defuelling safety cases and we will issue our agreement to the commencement of defuelling once we are satisfied with the safety cases.
- Post reporting period – Reactor 4 ceased operating on the 7 January 2022 and has been safely shutdown with all required post trip cooling established. Reactor 4 will commence defuelling once Reactor 3 has been defuelled.

4. Regulatory Activity

ONR may issue formal documents to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. Under nuclear site licence conditions, ONR issues regulatory documents, which either permit an activity or require some form of action to be taken; these are usually collectively termed 'Licence Instruments' (LIs) but can take other forms. In addition, inspectors may take a range of enforcement actions, to include issuing an Enforcement Notice.

- The following LIs, Enforcement Notices and Enforcement letters have been issued during the period:

Table 1: Licence Instruments and Enforcement Notices Issued by ONR during this period

Date	Type	Ref. No.	Description
13/12/21	Licence Instrument	LI 573	ONR agreed to the safety case for the 'declassification of the reactor pressure boundary and associated systems for the post generation phase', ONR-OFD-PAR-21-011. During defuelling the reactor pressure vessel is held at a lower pressure and temperature, this brings and number of safety benefits and reduces the maintenance and inspection requirements.

Reports detailing regulatory decisions can be found on the ONR website at <http://www.onr.org.uk/pars/>.

5. News from ONR

For the latest news and information from the Office for Nuclear Regulation, please read and subscribe to our regular email newsletter 'ONR News' at www.onr.org.uk/onrnews

6. Contacts

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Published 02/22

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Hunterston Site Stakeholder Group

SEPA Update- Hunterston B

3 March 2022 by teleconference

Chief Executive's Resignation

Following conduct allegations, SEPA's CEO, Terry A'Hearn, has stepped down and left his position. SEPA has a clear Code of Conduct and takes conduct allegations very seriously indeed. In order to protect anonymity, SEPA is unable to comment further. Recruitment for a new Chief Executive will shortly commence and in the interim, Jo Green will continue as Acting Chief Executive, supported by SEPA's Agency Management Team.

Cyber-Attack

On 24 December 2020, we were subject to a serious and complex cyber-attack, displaying significant stealth and malicious sophistication, which significantly impacted our organisation, our staff, our public and private partners, and the communities who rely on our services.

Since the attack, we have worked with Scottish Government, Police Scotland, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and the Scottish Business Resilience Centre (SBRC), to a clear recovery strategy.

We've published [Our response and recovery from a major cyber-attack](#), and a range of voluntary independent audit reports on our response and recovery from Police Scotland, the Scottish Business Resilience Centre and Azets. You can view these reports at sepa.org.uk/cyber-attack.

We will continue to publish the weekly service status until all our services have resumed, continuing to support our organisation, our staff, our public and private partners, and the communities who rely on our services, as we continue our recovery.

Regulation

Environmental Authorisations (Scotland) Regulations 2018 (EASR)- radioactive substances

Telephone communication with the station has continued throughout the period, including formal weekly call-downs with the Environmental Safety Group as well as monthly updates from the EDF internal regulator. Routine teleconferences with corporate EDF on strategic issues, including defueling and decommissioning, have also continued as before.

The site has been inspected once since the last SSG meeting. On 14 and 15 December 2021, SEPA staff along with staff from the EA and ONR attended the site to discuss the executable decommissioning plan for the station.

At the time of writing, there is another inspection planned for 22 February 2022 to look at the progress of the active effluent discharge line manhole refurbishment programme and inspect against radioactive waste transfers off-site. A verbal update of this inspection will be given at the meeting.

The station applied in July 2020 to regularise the receipt of radioactive waste in the form of debris in the incoming fuel transport flasks. Work continues to progress on determining the application.

Pollution Prevention and Control (PPC)

There have been no issues relating to the station's PPC permit for its non-radioactive emissions from the emergency diesel generators, auxiliary boilers and waste oil burner since the last scheduled SSG meeting.

Control of Major Accidents and Hazards (COMAH)

There have been no issues related to COMAH since the last scheduled SSG meeting.

Controlled Activities Regulations (CAR)

There have been no other issues relating to the stations' non-radioactive liquid discharges to the water environment since the last scheduled SSG meeting.

UK Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)

There have been no issues relating to the ETS since the last scheduled SSG meeting.

Environmental Events

The station experienced the loss of control of approximately 1500 litres of lightly radioactively contaminated waste oil from a gas circulator settling tank. The event came to light on 18 February 2022. The oil appears to have been captured at the 39-inch outfall and did not enter the environment. The event remains under investigation.

SEPA has concluded its investigation into the mis-consignment of one radioactive asbestos gasket in October 2021 to Cyclife. In light of the actions taken by the station and the fact that Cyclife is authorised to receive radioactive asbestos, SEPA has issued an advisory letter in response to the event.

Radioactivity in Food & the Environment (RIFE)

RIFE is a collaborative report on work carried out by SEPA, the other UK environment agencies, Food Standards Scotland and Food Standards Agency on the radiological monitoring of food and the environment. The RIFE reports aim to provide an in-depth assessment of radioactivity in food and the environment in the UK and the public's exposure to radiation, including in the vicinity of Hunterston B. The RIFE report incorporates the results from the analysis of a wide range of samples and key information on local habits to demonstrate both that food remains safe and that the public's exposure to ionising radiation is within legal limits.

The latest edition (RIFE 26) covering 2020 has been published and can be obtained from SEPA's website along with previous year's reports. RIFE 26 reports that the total dose for the representative person (most exposed) around the Hunterston site, which includes both Hunterston A and Hunterston B, for 2020 was 0.005 millisieverts, which is well below the legal annual dose limit of 1 millisievert as set out in paragraph 26, Schedule 8 of EASR19.

Scottish Pollutant Release Inventory (SPRI)

The Scottish Pollutant Release Inventory (SPRI) is a publicly accessible electronic database of releases of pollutants to all environmental media and transfers of non-radioactive waste. SEPA intends that, as far as practicable, SPRI be the principle means by which information on Scottish pollutant releases and non-radioactive waste transfers is collected and made public. Wherever possible, such information will be collected and presented by this one system. The data for 2019, including that from Hunterston A and B, have been published and are available on SEPA's website under "*Environment/Environmental data/SPRI*".

Mr Keith Hammond

Radioactive Substances Specialist

21 February 2022



HUNTERSTON A

SITE STAKEHOLDER GROUP REPORT

SITE DIRECTOR – MARK BLACKLEY

MARCH 2022

HUNTERSTON A
SITE DIRECTOR'S REPORT TO THE SITE STAKEHOLDER GROUP
MARCH 2022

Hunterston A continues to make good progress on our programme of work to Care and Maintenance. We continue to be adequately funded by the NDA and remain committed to addressing the nuclear liabilities at Hunterston A in a safe, secure manner with care for the environment.

1 SITE DIRECTOR OVERVIEW

Hunterston A site is part way through its Care and Maintenance Preparations (C&MP) phase of decommissioning which, subject to NDA approval and funding, is currently forecast to complete by October 2030 based on the current decommissioning strategy.

The sites COVID secure arrangements remain active and constantly under review. The site took proactive measures when the new omicron variant emerged and returned our Social Distancing requirements back to two metres, minimised close working on site and re-enforced the requirement for high level of hygiene and strongly encouraged home testing prior to attending site. The COVID secure arrangements remain suitable and sufficient and will be due review at end of February when more relaxations may be implemented.

There were no significant nuclear / conventional / radiological safety or security issues over the reporting period. The site has managed to safely deliver decommissioning work on site for the last 11 months with no Lost Time Accidents. The Magnox EHSS&Q Executive Team completed a review of the sites EHSS&Q arrangements and performance on the 16 February 2022. The site received positive feedback from the Executive committee and no concerns were identified.

There has been some excellent progress in a number of areas during the reporting period. The Higher Activity Waste team have now retrieved more than 62Te of Intermediate Level Waste to the Store since 1 April 2021. This exceeds the stretched target for the Year. Good progress is being made on improvements to welfare facilities, replacement of water damaged open floor gratings and Durbar walkways in both reactors and demolition of the Learning & Development Building

I am pleased to report that in addition to other vacancies that are being filled for the first time in a number of years, we are in the assessment and selection process for four trainee Radiological Protection roles, and we are advertising for two craft apprentices.

More details on some of these highlights are within the appropriate sections of this report.

2 SAFETY OVERVIEW

2.1 Safety Review Performance

Safety Performance on site is good. The site has managed to safely deliver decommissioning work on site for the last 11 months with no Lost Time Accidents. Our Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR) continues as part of the 12-month rolling total at **0.44** as a result of the single trip event reported March 2021.

We have had one (minor) First Aid case injury occurring during this period, a slight graze to the back of hand.

The Site did however have to call an ambulance to site in response to a person taking unwell on site (not work related). The individual was provided care and attention and then taken to A&E for further assessment. The individual has since returned to his normal duties. The sites First Aiders and Site Contingency Arrangements were enacted successfully.

The sites COVID secure arrangements remain active and constantly under review. The site took proactive measures when the new omicron variant became the new threat to site. We returned our Social Distancing requirements back to two metres, minimised close working on site and re-enforced the requirement for high level of hygiene and strongly encouraged home testing prior to attending site. The COVID secure arrangements remain suitable and sufficient and will be due review at end of February when suitable more relaxations may be implemented.

Target Zero continues to raise awareness on various topics such as reintroduction/refreshing awareness of Human Performance Tools and the current campaign of Radiological Protection. Human Performance has been instilled into Magnox way of working for a considerable time now but with new workfaces opening, new contractors and new personnel on site it is a timely refresher as is the Radiological protection campaign - this is seen as day job, but we must keep our focus and awareness on this hazard and not become complacent as the radiological hazard reduces through decommissioning processes.

The Magnox EHSS&Q Executive Team completed a review of the sites EHSS&Q arrangements and performance on the 16 February 2022. The site received positive feedback from the Executive committee and no concerns were identified.

In parallel to the EHSSQ Exec Review, Magnox Non-Executive Directors (NED's) visited the site to undertake an oversight review of sites progress and to get an understanding of the challenges and opportunities that may present as the site continues with the decommissioning of A Site. Again, the site received positive feedback from the visiting group.

The site Fire Safety Management group meet regularly to review the sites general fire safety arrangements to ensure they are effective and appropriate. The ONR Fire inspectors will be undertaking an inspection of the sites Fire Life Safety arrangements in March.

The sites reporting culture remains strong and healthy. We continue to receive over 100 Q Pulse reports every month and each report is assessed/reviewed appropriately either immediately or at the daily safety and compliance meeting and categorisation screened at the weekly event review meeting.

The site safety representatives meet fortnightly at the Local Safety Forum and bi-monthly HESAC (Health, Environment and Safety Advisory Committee) meetings. These meetings are well supported by Safety reps from Magnox and contracting partners and Magnox management and provide valuable engagement, cooperation and opportunity to address any issues/concerns and improvement raised on site including any suggested changes being introduced before implementation by Magnox. As a result of this engagement, phase one of the sites welfare facilities is well under way which is due for completion at the end of March 2022, with phases 2 and 3 following in the next financial years.

2.2 Emergency Arrangements

The sites Accident and Emergency Contingency Arrangements remain suitable and ever ready. The Site Contingency Teams undertake training exercises frequently to test and ensure that the Contingency arrangements remain suitable for the events that could foreseeably occur.

New working at height rescue equipment was demonstrated on site this month and an access contractor has purchased it and trained the full team in its use. It's refreshing to see that new innovative equipment is being recognised and utilised on site.

The site Security Guards frequently test their Silent Hours Contingency Arrangements during working shifts. These exercises and desktop scenarios that each team undertake on various threat considerations or other challenging scenarios are created by the site to test the arrangements.

All learning from these exercises is shared with all security guards and team leaders.

4 DECOMMISSIONING PROGRESS

4.1 Solid Intermediate Level Waste Encapsulation (SILWE) Project

The SILWE facility exists purely to encapsulate the 3M³ packages containing the solid waste retrieved/recovered from SAWBR with a grout mix. It is expected to take up to three years to encapsulate approximately 1500 stainless steel packages. Once encapsulated, the packages will be in their disposable state.

The SILWE Project continues with preparations for the commencement of Phase 2 Commissioning in April of 2022. Phase 2 will conclude with plant operations being managed via the SILWE control room.

In support of the next phase, the project has recently completed grouting operations on one 3M³ box as well as carrying out a dry fines



transfer into a 3M³ drum. A significant degree of learning was gained by running these sequences.

With the Robotic and Ventilation packages of work nearing completion, the project plan to transition into Phase 3 Commissioning in June of 2022, with Active Commissioning forecast to commence in the first quarter of 2024.

4.2 Hunterston Reactor Project / Plant & Structures

The reactor remedial repairs comprise two separate contracts, *Reactor Remedial Repairs* and *Reactor Interim Roof Remedial Works*. The appointed Principal Contractors for these contracts are Celadon, led by NSG Environmental and HLS McConnell respectively.

Reactor Remedial Repairs

The Reactor Remedial Repairs works programme has completed removal of all external cradle rails from both reactors and painting of exposed brackets, following the removal of the rails.

Works to replace water damaged open floor gratings and Durbar walkways in both reactors (approximately 90 separate locations) is now substantially complete in Reactor 1 and has started in both sectors of Reactor 2.



Scope to repair 27 column bases across both of the reactor buildings has also now commenced. The full scope of work on site is due to be completed by May 2022.

Reactor Interim Roof Remedial Works

The Reactor Interim Roof Remedial Works started on site in January 2022 with reassurance surveys and safety netting to secure a system inside the reactors under the roofs as a fall arrest measure. The reassurance monitoring is scheduled to complete in February and one half of Reactor 2 has been netted to date.

The main works to arrest water ingress to the roofs by applying a SIKA protection system will continue on, following completion of the fall arrest works and is due to be completed by early Autumn 2022.

Learning and Development (L&D) Centre Demolition Works

Plant and Structures are also undertaking a small-scale demolition project.

The appointed Principal Contractor is KDC.

This work has started on site as scheduled and the Contractor has mobilised and has commenced setting up



the site. The demolition project has a duration of approximately five weeks.


4.3 Solid Active Waste Bunker Retrieval (SAWBR) Project

The SAWBR facility was constructed to recover solid HAW (Higher Activity Waste) from within the site's five HAW bunkers. This is achieved by using remotely operated vehicles (ROV's) to fill hoppers that are then tipped into RWM (Radioactive Waste Management Ltd) approved 3m³ stainless steel boxes. The initial breakthrough into Bunker 5 was achieved in March 2014 and Bunkers 5, 4, 3 and 2 have been sequentially emptied to date.

The SAWBR facility continues to operate, processing waste from Bunker 1, with good progress being made in the period between December 2021 and February 2022, returning the plant back into service after the Christmas shutdown.

To date, the SAWBR team have safely exported a cumulative total of **199 3M³** boxes from Bunker 1 to the ILW Store - this equates to **120 Tonnes** of Bunker 1 waste. This brings the total of 3M³ boxes exported from SAWBR (all bunkers) to **1092 Boxes**. In this financial year, over **59 tonnes** of waste to date have been processed through SAWBR. Additional hours are being worked in SAWBR to help the company achieve its overall HAW targets for the year. The site's target has been revised and is now at **62 tonnes**. It is forecast that the bulk retrieval of waste from Bunker 1 should be completed by summer 2022.

The plant was shut down to allow planned, routine maintenance in SAWBR at the end of January for a week, providing an opportunity to progress non-process dependant maintenance activities and housekeeping tasks within the facility. The plant has since been returned to service and continues to export filled boxes of waste.



Bunker Waste Recovery Operations, showing a Brokk sorting waste from Bunker 1

4.4 Wet Intermediate Level Waste Retrieval & Encapsulation Plant (WILWREP)

The WILWREP facility was designed and constructed to recover and encapsulate Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) sludges, resins and acids stored in site tanks. The plant is now undergoing a reconfiguration to allow the processing of ILW Nitric acid, stored within the Acid Storage Facility. WILWREP operations personnel are assisting with these works and are also providing support as required to Waste Projects work on the

Pond Purge Sump Retrieval and Encapsulation Plant (PPSREP) – which is being installed for retrieval of sludges at a different location on site.


In parallel with the Waste Projects work mentioned above, the WILWREP Operations team has completed inactive commissioning and operator familiarisation of the new “Dumper Bot” and once permissions are in place this will be deployed into Sludge Retention Tank 3 (SRT 3).

The Dumper Bot will allow the team to remotely separate solid items of debris from the remaining sludge in SRT3 leading to completion of clearing the tank of both solid waste items and the remaining residual sludge. It is expected that these activities to clear SRT3 will take around two months.

Once SRT3 is cleared the Bot will be moved to SRT2 to complete the same task in that tank.



Residual sludge and miscellaneous debris in Sludge Retention Tank 3 in WILWREP



Dumper Bot during operator training within clean conditions prior to being deployed to the WILWREP inner tent.


4.5 Ponds Programme

Ponds ILW Retrieval

Good progress with design and approvals has been made in-period in support of the three key ILW scopes within the Pond at Hunterston A. Quarter 1 2022 will see the ILW within the West Stop Log Harbour Workshop and the Magnet screen transferred and

handed over to High Active Waste along with several consignments of ILW being transferred to SAWBR via the SAW flask. Weekly sessions have commenced with HAW, Maintenance and Operations to ensure that the work is fully enabled and that all parties and appropriately engaged.

Waste segregation is currently ongoing within the Pond thus ensuring waste follows the correct waste route. Waste transfers both from the West Stop log Harbour Workshop and from the SAW flask are anticipated to take place from the end of February and throughout March. The DPAF for the Magnet Screen will be presented to the committee at the forthcoming review scheduled for the 1 March 2022.




Photograph and drawing of Solid Active Waste Flask

New Effluent treatment Plant (NEffTP)

Work to design and install a New Effluent Treatment Plant within the Low-Level Waste Transfer Facility at Hunterston A is progressing well. This system will facilitate the eventual diversion of current miscellaneous effluent streams which will in turn enable wider decommissioning of site by creating redundancy in the systems and tanks currently still in use.

Manufacturing contractor Barr and Wray have now completed their scope which integration contractor JGC then assembled as far as was practicable at their Thurso site throughout December and January in order to minimise the work required onsite at Hunterston A. JGC mobilised for Hunterston on 14 February and are now completing their mechanical installation scope. EC&I integration will follow with installation being forecast complete by the end of March 2022.



NEffTP mechanical components shown partially assembled at JGC's facility

5 PEOPLE

5.1 Site HR

Recruitment continues to be a key focus and several opportunities are being advertised external to the Company to meet our current work delivery and for future succession. As well as sourcing experienced candidates we are also recruiting trainee positions. We are currently advertising for Craft Apprentices to commence at Hunterston this September and are also progressing through the assessment and selection process to recruit several Radiological Technician Trainees. In addition, several longstanding Agency Supplied Worker positions have also been agreed to be filled through a Magnox New Starter Employment Contract, providing greater security for the site in retention of skills and personally for the individuals.

We have recently received the results of the Employee Engagement Survey that was conducted across the NDA estate and in the forthcoming weeks will be reviewing the feedback specific to Hunterston to identify trends and from this develop an action plan with required improvements.

From April we will be introducing new Performance Management arrangements **Valuing Individual Performance (VIP)** which has been developed including feedback from employees and external benchmarking. The new arrangements are to assist in improving the value that Performance Conversations can bring through an increased focus on developing skills and supporting wellbeing.

It will also provide flexibility in its application to ensure the conversations are right for employees in terms of their role, aspirations, development, or support required.

5.2 Occupational Health

COVID cases continue to fluctuate and these and other absences due to health have not impacted on our ability to progress work. Sickness trends have continued to reduce.

Mental health and wellbeing of our employees continue to be a focus with our Hunterston Wellbeing Group and Mental Health First Aiders continuing to provide valuable articles with information and suggestions of how the workforce may improve their health and wellbeing through the four pillars of good health.

- ***Eat Well***
- ***Sleep Well***
- ***Move Well***
- ***Relax Well***



6 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY

Explanatory note: The maximum permissible dose to a radiation worker in the UK is 20mSv (milliSieverts) in a calendar year. The average annual radiation dose to the UK population from all sources is 2.6mSv. Collective dose is usually measured in man.milliSieverts. For example, if ten people were each to receive 0.1milliSieverts during a particular task, then the collective dose for the task would be 10 people x 0.1mSv each = 1 man.milliSievert.

Doses for the calendar year 2022, to the end of January, are as follows:

- *Approximately 122 employees and visitors received a total collective dose of 0.652 man.mSv between them*
- *Approximately 129 contractors received a total collective dose of 0.902 man.mSv between them*
- *The highest individual dose received by an employee was 0.129 mSv*
- *The highest individual dose received by a contractor was 0.065 mSv*

The majority of dose accrued in 2022 has been from a combination of the pond decommissioning project and other site projects. All doses in these projects have been prior assessed, planned and are tracked throughout the project duration to ensure that no limits are exceeded and that doses are kept as low as reasonably practicable.

7 ENVIRONMENT (January 2021 - December 2021)

7.1 Radioactive Discharges

Solid

Low Level Waste (LLW) disposals to the Low Level Waste Repository (LLWR) continue. 78.94m³ of LLW and VLLW with a total activity of 1.4 GBq was disposed of during the twelve-month period from January 2021 to December 2021. There is no limit on the volume or radioactivity content of LLW and VLLW being disposed of under the site EA(S)R Permit. The main contribution to these waste consignments was decommissioned plant, equipment, and materials generated during decommissioning operations.

Liquid

The main sources of liquid radioactive discharges during the period January 2021 - December 2021 were decontamination of various areas within the cartridge cooling ponds building, liquors generated through wet waste recovery and encapsulation processes, and routine waste water arisings from the site active drain system.

Radionuclide or Group of Radionuclides	Annual Limit	Activity discharged (Jan 2021 - Dec 2021)
Tritium	30 GBq	0.010 GBq
Caesium-137	160 GBq	0.056 GBq
Plutonium-241	2 GBq	0.003 GBq
All alpha emitting radionuclides not specifically listed taken together	2 GBq	0.003 GBq
All non-alpha emitting radionuclides not specifically listed taken together	60 GBq	0.054 GBq

Gaseous

The main contributions to gaseous radioactive discharges were ventilation systems operating in contamination controlled areas and reactor vessel 'breathing'.

Authorised Outlet, Group of Outlets or other discharge route	Radionuclide or Group of Radionuclides	Annual Limit	Activity discharged (Jan 2021 - Dec 2021)
All authorised outlets taken together.	Tritium	100 MBq	0.3 MBq
	All other radionuclides (excluding tritium)	3 MBq	0.383 MBq
Discharges made as a consequence of reactor breathing	Tritium	3000 MBq	469.16 MBq
	Carbon-14	200 MBq	56.04 MBq

7.2 Non-radiological Environmental update (January 2021 - December 2021)

Treated sewage effluent from the plant is not currently being independently assessed by SEPA due to SEPA Covid restrictions on visiting Site. Results from an independent off-site laboratory analysis verify that the sewage treatment works reed beds continue to work efficiently to maintain good quality effluent in compliance with the sites CAR discharge licence.

Monitoring and trending of data for resources such as water, electricity and fuel continues to determine where use can be minimised, in line with the site Environmental Management System. Over the period January 2021 to December 2021 the site used 16.60 Terra Joules (Tj) of energy; 15.85 Tj attributed to electricity consumption and 0.75 Tj attributed to fuel use in site vehicles, equipment, and generators. In the same 12-month period the site water consumption was 10,740m³. The site continues to report carbon equivalent emissions data as per the new company process.

New reporting requirements have been put in place for waste disposal and recycling with new reporting groups being established for use in the company unified dashboard. Over the period January 2021 to December 2021 a total of 78.00 tonnes of waste was collected for consignment from site (which was for recycling, recovery, or composting). There were no consignments for disposal to landfill. This gives a recycling rate of approximately 100%.

7.3 Environmental Events

There were no significant environmental events between September 2021 and December 2021.

8 SOCIO-ECONOMIC / STAKEHOLDER UPDATE

The electronic application form for the socio-economic scheme can be found on our external website at <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/magnox-working-with-our-communities>

Millport Town Hall Update

The £2m project received £50,000 NDA funding in April 2021 towards the transformation of the derelict town hall building to a heritage/conservation centre, arts/culture centre and community hub.

The project is progressing well, the contractor was appointed in September 2021 and the builders are now making progress, having fitted the first of the new windows this month. This is despite delays with the discovery of asbestos, bad weather over the winter months and the unexpected find of coal and a well in the basement to contend with.

In December the project received an uplift of £364k from the Scottish Government Regeneration fund to compensate for the price increases on materials and to cover the additional £49k incurred with the asbestos removal.

Six individuals are now employed, two temporarily through Covid recovery. The National Lottery funded a Community Liaison Officer who is now in post and is working on a big event, organised for Easter to engage with the community.

A revised opening date is towards the end of 2022.



Concept design of the main hall



Millport Town Hall Trustees finally getting the keys for the building

9 SITE VISITS AND KEY DATES

Hunterston A Site continues to attract the right kind of interest through our good safety and business performance. Below is a selection of visitors / key dates during the period, although there is still a reduction in visits over the period due to the Covid Pandemic.

DATE	EVENT / VISIT
Thursday 2 December	Scottish site Stakeholder Group Meeting (<i>Microsoft Teams Meeting</i>)
Thursday 2 December	Hunterston Decommissioning Teleconference Update by Site Director, Mark Blackley to Hunterston SSG Chair, Rita Holmes and SSG Vice Chair Stuart McGhie. (<i>Microsoft Teams Meeting</i>)
Wednesday 8 December	Magnox Safety Reps Conference 2021(<i>Microsoft Teams Meeting</i>)
Wednesday 5 January	Site Director's Return to Work Briefing - (<i>Microsoft Teams Meeting</i>)
Wednesday 26 January	Hunterston Decommissioning Teleconference Update by Site Director, Mark Blackley to Hunterston SSG Chair, Rita Holmes and SSG Vice Chair Stuart McGhie. (<i>Microsoft Teams Meeting</i>)
Wednesday 16 February	EHSS&Q Exec Review / Non- Executive Director Susan Jee attending



Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR)

Site Report for Hunterston A

Report for period 1 October – 31 December 2021

Foreword

This report is issued as part of ONR's commitment to make information about inspection and regulatory activities relating to the above site available to the public. Reports are distributed to members for the Hunterston Site Stakeholder Group and are also available on the ONR website (<http://www.onr.org.uk/lrc/>).

Site inspectors from ONR usually attend Hunterston Site Stakeholder Group meetings where they will respond to any questions raised there. Any person wishing to inquire about matters covered by this report should contact ONR.



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1 Inspections

Dates of inspection

The ONR site inspector made inspections at the Hunterston A (HNA) site on the following dates during the report period 1 October – 31 December 2021:

- 7 – 9 December 2021

2 Routine Matters

Inspections

Inspections are undertaken as part of the process for monitoring compliance with:

- the conditions attached by ONR to the nuclear site licence granted under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (NIA65) (as amended);
- the Energy Act 2013
- the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA74); and
- regulations made under HSWA74, for example the Ionising Radiations Regulations 2017 (IRR17) and the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (MHSWR99).

The inspections entail monitoring licensee's actions on the site in relation to incidents, operations, maintenance, projects, modifications, safety case changes and any other matters that may affect safety. The licensee is required to make and implement adequate arrangements under the conditions attached to the licence in order to ensure legal compliance. Inspections seek to judge both the adequacy of these arrangements and their implementation.

In this period, ONR carried out the following planned inspections at HNA:

Licence Condition (LC) compliance inspections: - compliance inspections focus on single LC compliance sampled from areas across the site. Each area may include multiple systems. The LCs inspected during this period were: -

- LC7 Incidents
- LC26 Control & supervision of operations

During the reporting period, ONR judged the arrangements made and implemented by the site in response to safety requirements to be satisfactory in the areas inspected. Where improvements have been identified, the licensee has made a commitment to address those issues, and ONR inspectors will closely monitor progress during future site inspections. Where necessary, ONR will take formal regulatory enforcement action to ensure that appropriate remedial measures are implemented to reasonably practicable timescales. Members of the public, who would like further information on



ONR's inspection activities during the reporting period, can view site Intervention Reports at www.onr.org.uk/intervention-records on our website www.onr.org.uk. Should you have any queries regarding our inspection activities, please email contact@onr.gov.uk.

Other work

The site inspector held a periodic meeting with safety representatives, to support their function of representing employees and receiving information on matters affecting their health, safety and welfare at work.

3 Non-Routine Matters

Licensees are required to have arrangements to respond to non-routine matters and events. ONR inspectors judge the adequacy of the licensee's response, including actions taken to implement any necessary improvements.

There were no such matters or events of significance during the period.

COVID-19

In response to the Covid-19 pandemic all 12 of Magnox Ltd.'s (ML) licensed sites have put arrangements in place to ensure their workplaces are COVID-secure sites. The sites have returned to a new "normal" with many staff combining working from home and at site as appropriate, with project work restarted to ensure the safe and timely decommissioning of these sites. In this quarter, HNA has continued with a controlled return to service with a number of staff working from home and at site as appropriate and has progressed a significant way through their plans. The ML Internal Oversight team has checked independently that the pandemic and restart arrangements have been properly implemented.

Emergency preparedness is being maintained through a duty cover team at each site in accordance with ONR approved emergency arrangements. These arrangements include the provision to call in additional personnel and the emergency services onto site to assist ML staff. These plans have been regularly rehearsed and observed by ONR inspectors during emergency exercises in the past.

Overall ONR is content with the actions taken by ML to make safe the HNA site under these exceptional circumstances. The site inspector is in touch regularly with HNA personnel to discuss any changes to the arrangements and any potential emerging safety or regulatory issues.



4 Regulatory Activity

ONR may issue formal documents to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. Under nuclear site licence conditions, ONR issues regulatory documents, which either permit an activity or require some form of action to be taken; these are usually collectively termed 'Licence Instruments' (LIs) but can take other forms. In addition, inspectors may take a range of enforcement actions, to include issuing an Enforcement Notice.

- No LIs, Enforcement Notices or Enforcement letters were issued during this period.

5 News from ONR

For the latest news and information from the Office for Nuclear Regulation, please read and subscribe to our regular email newsletter 'ONR News' at www.onr.org.uk/onrnews

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Hunterston Site Stakeholder Group

SEPA Update- Hunterston A

3 March 2022 by teleconference

Chief Executive's Resignation

Following conduct allegations, SEPA's CEO, Terry A'Hearn, has stepped down and left his position. SEPA has a clear Code of Conduct and takes conduct allegations very seriously indeed. In order to protect anonymity, SEPA is unable to comment further. Recruitment for a new Chief Executive will shortly commence and in the interim, Jo Green will continue as Acting Chief Executive, supported by SEPA's Agency Management Team.

Cyber-Attack

On 24 December 2020, we were subject to a serious and complex cyber-attack, displaying significant stealth and malicious sophistication, which significantly impacted our organisation, our staff, our public and private partners, and the communities who rely on our services.

Since the attack, we have worked with Scottish Government, Police Scotland, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and the Scottish Business Resilience Centre (SBRC), to a clear recovery strategy.

We've published Our response and recovery from a major cyber-attack, and a range of voluntary independent audit reports on our response and recovery from Police Scotland, the Scottish Business Resilience Centre and Azets. You can view these reports at sepa.org.uk/cyber-attack.

We will continue to publish the weekly service status until all our services have resumed, continuing to support our organisation, our staff, our public and private partners, and the communities who rely on our services, as we continue our recovery.

Regulation

Environmental Authorisations (Scotland) Regulations 2018 (EASR)- radioactive substances

In addition to the cyber-attack, SEPA has also had to continue to manage the COVID-19 pandemic and its associated restrictions.

Telephone communication with the site continued throughout the period since the last SSG in December, including formal monthly staying in touch telephone calls. Routine teleconferences with Hunterston A and the corporate Magnox Ltd team on strategic issues have also continued as before.

Site visits continue to be planned in order to ensure compliance with the site permit. Since the last Hunterston SSG in December, one site visit was undertaken at Hunterston A on 14th December 2021 following a visit in October by SEPA where there were some additional questions that arose.

The visit in December involved an additional inspection of solid ILW waste package records, encompassing viewing fingerprint and sampling records and methodologies. In addition, this information was viewed for the sludges which have been collected from the sludge retention tanks. SEPA had also requested Magnox provide a brief presentation on the totality of the package records being retained by the site. There are still areas to look at with regards to the retention of package records and a further inspection will be planned in the near future.

At the time of writing, there is another inspection planned for 1st March 2022 to look at the maintenance schedules of any safety/ environment equipment and how the site ensures that the equipment is fit for use when they have not been used for a prolonged period due to the nature and frequency of potential discharges from the site. This is a joint inspection with ONR. In addition, SEPA will be having a meeting during the day to discuss BPM documentation relating to a number of projects.

Magnox provided SEPA with a programme for the coming year for the HNA site with regards to potential variations to the site permit and associated environmental documentation.

SEPA has requested that Magnox provide a list of extant/ current BPM documentation for the HNA site.

Non-Rad Regulation

There have been no issues relating to non-rad regulation since the last scheduled SSG meeting.

Environmental Events

There have been no environmental events reported to SEPA by the site during the period.

There were no other reportable incidents, complaints or non-compliance events affecting SEPA's interests at Hunterston A known to have occurred since the last meeting of the SSG at the time of writing this report.

Magnox have provided all requested information to SEPA with regards to the error that was identified within one of the radionuclide fingerprints recorded on a spreadsheet used to calculate the radioactivity content of low level solid waste (see information provided at September/ December SSG meetings).

Radioactivity in Food & the Environment (RIFE)

RIFE is a collaborative report on work carried out by SEPA, the other UK environment agencies, Food Standards Scotland and Food Standards Agency on the radiological monitoring of food and the environment. The RIFE reports aim to provide an in-depth assessment of radioactivity in food and the environment in the UK and the public's exposure to radiation, including in the vicinity of Hunterston B. The RIFE report incorporates the results from the analysis of a wide range of samples and key information on local habits to demonstrate both that food remains safe and that the public's exposure to ionising radiation is within legal limits.

The latest edition (RIFE 26) covering 2020 has been published and can be obtained from SEPA's website along with previous year's reports. RIFE 26 reports that the total dose for the representative person (most exposed) around the Hunterston site, which includes both Hunterston A and Hunterston B, for 2020 was 0.005 millisieverts, which is well below the legal annual dose limit of 1 millisievert as set out in paragraph 26, Schedule 8 of EASR19.

Scottish Pollutant Release Inventory (SPRI)

The Scottish Pollutant Release Inventory (SPRI) is a publicly accessible electronic database of releases of pollutants to all environmental media and transfers of non-radioactive waste. SEPA intends that, as far as practicable, SPRI be the principle means by which information on Scottish pollutant releases and non-radioactive waste transfers is collected and made public. Wherever possible, such information will be collected and presented by this one system. The data for 2019, including that from Hunterston A and B, have been published and are available on SEPA's website under "*Environment/Environmental data/SPRI*".

Melanie Hayes
Radioactive Substances Specialist
22 February 2022

Scottish Government Update to Hunterston Site Stakeholder Group – 3rd March 2022

Scottish Government Radioactive Waste and Nuclear Decommissioning Policy Team

BEIS led Policy Review (Command Paper 2919)

We are continuing to engage with BEIS and other organisations on the development of the draft policy framework and the process for consultation by providing comments and input regarding the policy and context in Scotland. The development process is a significant piece of work which is still ongoing and the consultation will potentially launch in the early part of this year.

The Scottish Government will continue to feed into this work and provide further updates as this develops.

UK Radioactive Substances Common Framework

We have been working with the UK Government and the other devolved administrations on a Common Framework Agreement regarding Radioactive Substances policy. The Framework establishes an agreed approach between the four UK administrations where powers have returned from the EU which intersect with policy areas of devolved competence and is intended to put in place a governance structure and shared ways of working in line with our current and future obligations. This is part of a wider programme of work to develop frameworks across a range of policy areas.

The draft framework has now been submitted to all four UK Parliaments for scrutiny and has been published online at the following link;

[Radioactive substances: provisional common framework - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/radioactive-substances-provisional-common-framework)

Higher Activity Waste Policy (HAW) Review

Following on from the initial work done to consider issues around the Higher Activity Waste Radioactive Waste Policy 2011 (the 2011 Policy) and scope for a potential consultation exercise on that document, we have now decided to focus our work on the implementation of the 2011 Policy and Higher Activity Radioactive Waste Strategy 2016 (the 2016 Strategy).

The first part of this is a technical work stream to be undertaken with the NDA to develop our thinking around near surface disposal concepts for Scotland. This will also include work to help us better understand the radioactive waste inventory in Scotland, including which radioactive waste is suitable for near surface disposal and that which is not. We are also taking forward work to take stock of and progress the

programme of actions set out in the 2016 Strategy and to consider the issues and challenges that have arisen to date.

We will continue to engage with the members of this group collectively and individually to take this work forward.

Scottish Government

3rd March 2022